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TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL

JURISDICTION
ARTHUR M. WEISBURD*

Considerable controversy exists regarding the extent to which American state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents not
present in the forum state. On the one hand, the Supreme Court apparently established a clear standard in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.' In World-Wide, the Court explained that due process limitations

on personal jurisdiction reflect both the right of the defendant to a fair

proceeding and territorial limitations on state power.2 Given this second
consideration, the Court held that only courts of those states with which
the defendant's contacts are intentional or to which the stream of com-

merce carries some product sold by the defendant can subject nonresident defendants to their jurisdiction.3 The Court expressly rejected the

argument that the plaintiff's convenience or the forum state's interest in
applying its own law were in any way relevant to the territorial power
question. 4 Despite the clarity of the World-Wide rule, distinguished
commentators continue to attack the conclusions of that case.' Further,
one commentator suggests that such factors as a state's interest in applying its own law and the plaintiff's relative convenience should be treated
as controlling in the jurisdictional inquiry.6 Indeed, some legal scholars

would treat personal jurisdiction as a venue question and rely on strict
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1970,
Princeton University; J.D. 1976, University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the
support of the North Carolina Law Center. The author also wishes to express gratitude for the
thoughtful comments of Joseph Kalo, Martin Louis, Marianne Smythe and Judith Wegner and for
the assistance of Polly Passonneau and Laura Lape.
1. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
2. Id. at 291-92.
3. Id. at 297-98.
4. Id. at 294.
5. See, e.g., Braveman, InterstateFederalism and PersonalJurisdiction, 33 SYRAcusE L. REV.
533 (1982); Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction,60 WASH. U.L.Q.
1291 (1983); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal,
59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1981); Lewis, A Brave New World For PersonalJurisdiction Flexible Tests
Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1984); Redish, Due Process,Federalism,and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
6. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U.L. REv. 279, 313, 327-28 (1983).
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choice-of-law rules to protect defendants from abuse.7
The importance of the difference in views between the Court and com
mentators is easy to underestimate. In any particular lawsuit, the only
consequence of a successful challenge to personal jurisdiction is that a
plaintiff who preferred to sue in one state must begin again in another
state. Thus, treatment of personal jurisdiction issues as involving noth
ing more important than a choice of courthouses is hardly surprising. To
stop the analysis here, however, is to miss the fundamental issue that
personal jurisdiction questions raise-governmental authority. When
the Supreme Court holds that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant, that defendant is exempt from the state's control. The Court
is saying, in effect, that the state is not entitled to demand from this de
fendant the deference that governments may expect from their own citi
zens. The controversy over standards of personal jurisdiction therefore
implicates more than just selecting a courthouse; it is a dispute about
how to determine when a particular state government may demand obe
dience from a particular person.
This disagreement between the Supreme Court and legal writers goes
to the heart of basic questions of legal obligation in this country and thus
deserves resolution. An examination of the two positions makes it clear
why resolution is difficult: the disputants not only reach different conclu
sions, but also define the problem in fundamentally different ways.
Those commentators who disagree with the Supreme Court's view tend
to see the issue first and foremost as one of litigation fairness-finding a
place to litigate the lawsuit that is likely to minimize problems of proof
and inconvenience to the parties. 8 The Supreme Court's approach in
World-Wide, however, is completely different. The Court justified the
limitations that it imposed on state jurisdiction as logically inevitable
consequences of the general territorial limitations on state sovereignty,
flowing from the states' status as co-equal members of the federation that
is the United States.9 The Court considered the limits of personal juris
diction as an aspect of the limits on state authority generally. Although
the Court invoked interstate federalism 10 as the limiting factor on juris7. See, e.g., Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation? Federal Choice-of-Law
Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (1981).
8. Braveman, supra note 5, at 564 n.28; Jay, supra note 5, at 453-54; Lewis, supra note S, at
26-38; Redish, supra note 5, at 1137-42; von Mebren, supra note 6, at 3()().11.
9. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294.
10. Id.
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diction, it did not explain the connection between the general concept of
federalism and the particular limitations that World-Wide imposed on
state court jurisdiction. Rather, the Court asserted its conclusion and
then stopped.
Problems clearly exist with the approaches of both the Supreme Court
and the commentators. The commentators' approach is the more flawed.
If territorial limitations on the reach of state sovereignty actually exist,
then any particular aspect of state power, such as judicial jurisdiction,
must necessarily be subject to those limits. The general limits on state
sovereignty, therefore, must be the starting point of the analysis. At
tempts to address issues of personal jurisdiction without addressing the
larger issue of the limits of state sovereignty ignore a key part of the
problem. Indeed, the very term "jurisdiction" indicates that the issue
deals with fundamental limitations on authority. 11 A simple reference to
the efficient functioning of the institution whose authority is in issue can
not answer questions of the limits of authority, unless efficiency is
demonstrated to be a source of authority for that institution.
The World-Wide approach is also problematic. The Court, by failing
to spell out the steps in its reasoning, has caused considerable and unnec
essary mystification. Moreover, while the Court's approach of deducing
limits on one element of state sovereignty from general limits on state
sovereignty makes sense as a matter of logic, the particular conclusion it
reached-that a defendant is subject to the jurisdiction only of those
states with which he sought contact or to which his products come
through the stream of commerce-does not follow clearly from the
premises of the argument.
This Article seeks to clear up the confusion caused by the arguments
of commentators and the holes in World-Wide. More specifically, it
seeks to show that the Supreme Court was correct in its implicit assertion
in World-Wide that, given the nature of the federal system, the authority
of American states is territorially limited. It further seeks to determine
the content of the general territorial limitations on state authority and to
deduce the particular limitations that should apply to personal jurisdic
tion. The Article concludes that the Supreme Court was correct in as
serting that the logic of the federal system requires the conclusion that a
state may assert jurisdiction only over nonresidents who have liability11. "[T)he authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases
....Power and authority of a court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 766 (5th ed.1979).
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related contacts with state territory. The Articles also concludes, how
ever, that the federalism argument does not logically support the require
ment that the defendant's contacts be intentional.
This Article will achieve its objectives through a three-part discussion.
Part I provides a brief description of the development of the law of per
sonal jurisdiction in the United States. In Part II, the Article presents in
detail the arguments supporting the conclusions described above. Part
III will refute various arguments that have been raised attacking terri
tory-based jurisdictional analysis.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court considered the question of personal jurisdiction as
early as 1850 in D'Arcy v. Ketchum. 12 In D'Arcy, the Court held that a
judgment against a defendant over whom the court rendering judgment
never obtained personal jurisdiction was not entitled to enforcement
outside the rendering state under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. 13 The Court further held that "the international law as it
existed among the states in 1790" 14 determined the existence of personal
jurisdiction.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 15 the Court held that a personal judgment against
a nonresident was entitled to full faith and credit only if the defendant
was either served with process within the forum state or consented to the
state's jurisdiction. 16 In extended dictum more influential than its hold
ing, the Pennoyer Court stated that a personal judgment against a non
resident obtained without in-state service of process was not enforceable
in the forum state. A judgment so obtained, the Court stated, denied the
defendant the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The
Court noted that due process required that courts must obtain in-state
service of process before their assertions of jurisdiction could be valid. 17
In the decades following Pennoyer, courts treated its dictum as con
trolling and continued to view personal jurisdiction as a matter of due
process. Pennoyer's insistence upon in-state service of process, however,
12. 52 U.S. (11 Howard) 165 (1850).
13. Id. at 175-76.
14. Id. at 176.
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
16. Id. at 729-33. The Court supported these standards of jurisdiction with a reference to
D'Arcy's invocation of "the international law as it existed among the states in 1790." Id. at 730.
17. Id. at 733.
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was increasingly circumvented as courts found themselves faced with
torts committed by persons temporarily in the state or with breaches of
contracts negotiated and performed in several states. Finally, in Interna
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 18 the Supreme Court reformulated the
Pennoyer test. The Court held that an absent defendant could properly
be sued in a state if he had "certain minimum contacts" with the state
such that maintenance of the suit did not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." 19 The Court stressed that the less ex
tensive the defendant's contacts were, the more closely the contacts must
relate to the litigation at issue if assertion of jurisdiction was to satisfy
due process.20 The Court �so emphasized that a state may not assert
jurisdiction over a defendant "with which the state has no contacts, ties,
or relations." 21
The minimum contacts tests was strongly restated in Hanson v.
Denckla. 22 In Hanson, the Court stressed that limitations on the per
sonal jurisdiction of state courts were a consequence of "territorial limi
tations on the power of the respective states."23 The Court rejected the
argument that in-state activity by one claiming a relationship to the de
fendant could satisfy the minimum contacts test, and insisted that de
fendant's contact with the state must be purposeful.24
Over the next eighteen years, the Supreme Court addressed personal
jurisdiction infrequently, 25 and state courts began to edge away from
Hanson's strict emphasis on proof of purposeful contact to establish per
sonal jurisdiction.26 In World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson,27
however, the Court restated the Hanson rule.
The Robinsons, plaintiffs in World-Wide, purchased a car while they
were domiciled in New York, from Seaway, a New York car dealership.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. at 317-18.
21. Id. at 319.
22. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
23. Id. at 251.
24. Id. at 253.
25. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (dealing with personal jurisdiction in
a family law context); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (although addressing personal jurisdic
tion issues, Shaffer was noteworthy mainly for holding unconstitutional the assertion of so-called
quasi in rem jurisdiction).
26. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969).
27. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Electing to move to Arizona some time after the purchase, the Robinsons
were involved in an automobile accident as they drove through
Oklahoma. They sued Seaway; its distributor, World-Wide; the importer
of the car; and the manufacturer on a products liability theory in
Oklahoma state court. World-Wide and Seaway's attack on the court's
jurisdiction lost in the Oklahoma courts but succeeded in the Supreme
Court.28
The World-Wide Court described the minimum contacts test as serv
ing two functions; it not only protected defendants from distant litiga
tion, but also insured that the "States, through their courts," did not
reach beyond the limits of their sovereignty.29 The Court referred to
"principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution," and
stressed that the Constitution intended the states to retain attributes of
sovereignty, that each state's sovereignty implied a limit on that of other
states, and that such limitations were "express or implicit in . . . the
original scheme of the Constitution."30 The Court expressly held that
federalism considerations could divest a state of jurisdiction even when
the state had an interest in the litigation and was in no sense an inconve
nient forum.31 The Court held that jurisdiction depended on the defend
ant's purposeful conduct in seeking direct or indirect contact with the
forum. The Court included within its definition of purposefulness the
placing of goods in the "stream of the commerce" by which the goods are
carried to the state. Finding not even that degree of purpose on the part
of Seaway and World-Wide, the Court held that they were not subject to
Oklahoma's jurisdiction.32 The Court did not, however, explain how
its purposefulness standard related to the controlling federalism
considerations.
While World-Wide has drawn some sympathetic comment,33 the deci
sion has also received much hostile criticism. The criticism has varied,
but the critics agree that federalism ought to have nothing to do with due
28. Id. at 288.
29. Id. at 291-92.
30. Id. at 293.
31. Id. at 294.
32. Id. at 295-99.
33. See, e.g., Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic
tion, 1980 SUP. Cr. REv. 77, 85; Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58
N.C.L. REv. 407 (1980).
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process analysis of jurisdiction, 34 that due process jurisdictional analysis
ought to turn on questions of convenience, and that the question of con
venience to be considered is that of both parties. 35 These writers share
the view that the limits on state authority are irrelevant to jurisdictional
analysis. 36 Alternatively, these writers may be implicitly arguing that no
territorial limits on state authority exist, and that therefore the only rea
son to forbid a state to take jurisdiction is that the state's assertion of
authority would prejudice a litigant.
The basic assumption of this Article is that this approach is wrong.
Because an assertion of jurisdiction is an assertion of authority, the exist
ence of such authority must be demonstrated before any questions can
arise as to proper policies for its exercise. Furthermore, the territorial
authority of states in the American federal system is necessarily limited.
II.

TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION

This Article asserts that territorial limitations on state court jurisdic
tions may be deduced from general federalism-related territorial limita
tions on state sovereignty. This assertion involves three propositions:
first, that state sovereignty, as a matter of law, is limited territorially;
second, that judicial jurisdiction is an aspect of the state's limited sover
eignty; and third, that one may logically determine the content of territo
rial limits on judicial jurisdiction if one knows the content of general
territorial limits on state authority. Each of these propositions requires
some elaboration.
The first proposition rests on the argument that governments are gov
ernments of particular territories. Within its territory, a government has
authority over things and people. That is, a government does not merely
exercise brute power, but combines power with a claim on the obedience
of whoever comes directly or indirectly within its territory. As to people
outside its territory whose acts are unrelated to the territory, however, a
government has no claim to obedience. Of course a government controls
instruments of power and may choose to exercise those instruments in an
34. Braveman, supra note 5, at 534-54; Jay, supra note 5, at 474-75; Redish, supra note 5, at
1120-33.
35. Braveman, supra note 5, at 564 n.228; Jay, supra note 5, at 453-54; Lewis, supra note 5, at
26-38; von Mehren, supra note 6, at 300-1 I.
36. Professor Redish acknowledges that such considerations arguably are relevant in a full faith
and credit context, although, he suggests, they probably should be ignored. Redish, supra note 5, at
1136-37.
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unprincipled way, but such actions are ultra vires, that is, beyond its
rightful authority.
The foregoing general limitations on governments apply to the states
because the United States is a federation-an entity composed of smaller
entities, each of which retains a measure of sovereignty. The states of the
union are not mere administrative bodies, but are units distinct from the
federal government. Of course, the states have relinquished, either in
whole or in part, to the federal government their power concerning many
subjects. Regarding many subjects, including much of the subject matter
of litigation in the state courts, however, the states enjoy a large measure
of sovereignty. Certainly, in their mutual dealings, the states can be
compared to independent countries. Thus, because the nature of the
American federation leaves a high degree of autonomy to the states, the
members of the federation are most accurately seen as distinct govern
ments. Accordingly, the territorial limitations described above as apply
ing to governments generally should be expected to apply to the state
governments.
Reference to federalism-related territorial limitations on state author
ity is not intended to suggest that personal jurisdiction issues necessarily
require consideration of some aspect of federal-state or interstate rela
tions. Rather, its description of territorial limitations on states as feder
alism-related means that, by organizing itself as a federation, the United
States left a measure of sovereignty to the states. Therefore, because the
authority of independent governments is limited by their territory, the at
least-semi-sovereign states ought to be subject to similar limitations.
While the proposition may be stated fairly simply, establishing that the
authority of the states is inherently territorially limited as a matter of law
is not so simple. Proof cannot be found in the text of the Constitution
because that document does not address the issue. Indeed, one would
not expect it to do so. Questions of the scope of the territorial authority
of the states will arise only in cases of potential conflict between two
states, because the differentiation in powers between the states and the
federal government turns on questions of subject matter rather than of
geography. The Constitution, however, was simply intended to establish
the federal government and address potential federal-state conflicts.
Given the long-standing existence of the states in 1787, the Constitu
tional Convention not surprisingly found it unnecessary to "establish" or
define generally the powers of functioning state governments.
Although the Constitution does not spell out the geographical limits of
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state authority, the courts have nonetheless had the opportunity to de
cide whether, as a matter of law, particular states may assert authority
extra-territorially. As the cases set forth in the remainder of Part II will
demonstrate, the courts have simply assumed that state authority is lim
ited to state territory and have, in a number of contexts, held invalid
actions amounting to the exercise of authority beyond state territory. 37
These decisions have implicitly upheld the proposition that, as a matter
of law, a state's power is territorially limited. 38
The second proposition is that a state's judicial jurisdiction is subject
to the same limits that apply to state authority generally. This proposi
tion is made explicit here because commentators often do not address the
fact that an assertion of jurisdiction is a claim of state authority. But
surely this point is beyond question. Every time a summons issues, the
state is ordering a defendant to come to court and warning him that if he
disobeys, he will suffer judgment. The state is further claiming the right
to make a determination, binding everywhere, of the legal quality of de
fendant's acts. This state action is more than an effort to provide a forum
for dispute resolution; it is an exercise of governmental power. Asser
tions of jurisdiction, therefore, must be subject to the same limitations
that exist for exercises of government power generally.
Finally, the third proposition is that if one knows the content of gen
eral limitations on sovereignty, one can deduce the content of limitations
on jurisdiction. This again seems self-evident. The problem is determin
ing the content of the putative general limitations on state authority.
Here the following discussion of cases will be instructive. Each case pro
vides a set of circumstances that a court has held to be an improper exer
cise of state authority. Considering the cases together will permit the
formulation of general rules defining what activities are beyond a state's
geographical reach. From the general rules, particular rules dealing with
jurisdiction can be deduced. The conclusion that emerges from this anal
ysis is that a state may only assert jurisdiction over an absent nonresident
defendant if the defendant's liability in the suit arises out of events or
things within the state. The analysis also demonstrates, however, that a
defendant's intent to have contacts with the state is irrelevant.
37. See infra notes 40-105 and accompanying text.
38. For a discussion of the argument that ultra vires analysis of assertions of personal jurisdic
uon is fundamentally unsound in light of precedent, and contrary to language in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland. see infra notes 114-127 and accompanying text.
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A. Local Action Rule
The cases upholding the "local action rule" provide an excellent exam
ple of a line of decisions in which state assertion of authority was held
unlawful due to territorial limits on state authority. The local action rule
provides that the courts of one state cannot directly affect title to real
property located in another state.39 Since Massie v. Watts,40 courts have
universally held that only the court of the situs could affect title.41 Con
sequently, a court of one state may not decide that a deed to land in
another state is void;42 a court in one state may not empower an individ
ual to convey land elsewhere43 or transfer title to land in another state by
its own decree;44 and a probate court may not pass on questions of de
scent of land in another state.45 Decisions violating the local action rule
are not entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the situs.46
Courts have justified the local action rule as an aspect of the basic
notion that the law of the situs must control all questions relating to
ownership and transfer of local land.47 In Clarke v. Clarke,48 the
39. Livingston v. Jefferson,15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411). Disagreement exists
about which actions are local and which transitory, Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521,
249 S.W.2d 994 (1952). It is clear,however,that suits to enforce land contracts to convey land are
transitory,Steele v. Bryant,132 Ky. 569,116 S.W. 755 (1909); Putnam & Norman Ltd. v. Conner,
144 La. 231, 80 So. 265 (1918); Gardner v. Ogden,22 N.Y. 327 (1860).
40. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810).
41. See, e.g., Northern Ind. R.R. v. Michigan Cent. R.R.,56 U.S. (15 How.) 233 (1853); Watts
v. Waddle,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 389 (1832); Launer v. Griffin,60 Cal. App. 2d 659,141 P.2d 236 (1943);
Courtney v. Henry, 114 Ill. App. 635 (1904); Cooper v. Hayes, 96 Ind. 386 (1884); Gaskins v.
Gaskins,311 Ky. 59,223 S.W.2d 374 (1949); Union Nat'l Bank v. State Nat'l Bank,155 Mo. 95,55
S.W. 989 (1900); In re Heirship of Robinson,119 Neb. 285,228 N.W. 852 (1930); Johnson v. Dun
bar, 114 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1952),ajf'd, 282 A.D. 720, 122 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1953),ajf'd, 306 N.Y. 697,
117 N.E.2d 801 (1954); In re Estate of Ray, 74 Wyo. 317, 287 P.2d 629 (1955).
42. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); Davis v. Headley, 22 N.J. Eq. 115 (1871).
43. Watkins v. Holman,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 25 (1842); Beach v. Youngblood,215 Iowa 979,247
N.W. 545 (1933); Decker v. Hickman,116 Okla. 65,243 P. 516 (1925); Wilson v. Braden,48 W. Va.
196, 36 S.E. 367 (1900).
44. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); City Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 68 Ill. 348 (1873);
Cooley v. Scarlett, 38 Ill. 317 (1865); McRary v. McRary,228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948).
45. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); In re Estate of Reed,233 Kan. 531, 664 P.2d 824
(1984).
46. In re Clarke,70 Conn. 195,39 A. 155 (1898),aff'd sub nom. Clarke v. Clarke,178 U.S. 186
(1900); Pritchard v. Henderson,18 Del. 553,47 A. 376 (1900); Norris v. Loyd,183 Iowa 1056,168
N.W. 557 (1918); In re Estate of Reed, 233 Kan. 531, 664 P.2d 824 (1984); but see Robertson v.
Pickrell,109 U.S. 608 (1883); Applegate v. Brown,344 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1961); Welch v. Trustees of
the Robert A. Welch Found., 465 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
47. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915); DeVaugh v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566 (1897);
Brine v. Insurance Co.,96 U.S. 627 (1877); United States v. Crosby,11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115 (1812).
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Supreme Court held that a South Carolina probate decree that purported
to adjudicate title to Connecticut land was not entitled to full faith and
credit in Connecticut. The Court stated:
[I]t is said . . . in such a case, not the will but the decree of the South
Carolina court, construing the will, is the measure of the rights of the par
ties, as to real estate in Connecticut. The proposition, when truly compre
hended, amounts but to the contention that the laws of the respective States
controlling the transmission of real property by will, or in case of intestacy,
are operative only so long as there does not exist in a foreign jurisdiction a
judgment or decree which in legal effect has changed the law of the situs of
the real estate. This is but to contend that ...the fundamental principle
which gives to a sovereignty an exclusive jurisdiction over the land within
its borders is in legal effect dependent upon the non-existence of a decree of
court of another sovereignty determining the status of such land. Mani
festly, however, an authority cannot be said to be exclusive, or even to exist
at all, where its exercise may be thus frustrated at any time.49

The Court further held that the land was beyond the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the South Carolina courts.50 It is important to stress that
the Clarke Court offered no policy justifications for its result. Rather, it
simply made clear that South Carolina had attempted to control Con
necticut land. The Court treated the result as inevitable, simply because
that judgment sought to affect land in another state. Significantly, all
claimants to the land were South Carolinians. Nonetheless, South Caro
lina's inability to directly affect Connecticut was taken as given. The
cases applying the local action rule, therefore, support the proposition
that a state is without authority to regulate at least one category of trans
actions taking place outside its borders-those involving land title. This
lack of authority, further, derives simply from the fact of the land's for
eign location. 51
48. 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
49. Id. at 191-92.
50. Id. at 193.
5 l. The only possible exception to this principle involves equitable decrees purporting to adju
dicate rights to foreign land in transitory actions, for example, suits that may be brought in any one
of several places. See supra note 39. It is generally conceded that a court of equity may order a
litigant appearing before it to make a conveyance of foreign land, and that a conveyance made in
such circumstances is effective if the question arises in an action not dealing directly with title.
Steele, supra note 39; Putnam & Norman, supra note 39; Gardner, supra note 39. Given this willing
ness to honor deeds made pursuant to a foreign decree, some commentators argue that the decree
itself should be enforceable in the state where the land lies if the defendant refuses to make a deed.
Alternatively, writers urge that the operation of collateral estoppel should settle the legal issues
between the parties. Barbour, The Extra Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 MICH. L.

388

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 63:377

This line of cases provides an example of what constitutes extra-terriREv. 527 (1919); Currie,Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 620
(1954); Lorenzen,Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Convey
ance of Foreign Land, 34 YALE L.J. 591 (1925); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity
Decrees, 42 IowA L. REv. 183 (1957). Accordingly some courts either enforce such decrees or give
them estoppel effect as a matter of full faith and credit. Day v. Wiswall,11 Ariz. App. 306,464 P.2d
626 (1970); Barber v. Barber,51 Cal. 2d 244,331 P.2d 628 (1958) (accepting principle but refused to
enforce decree because rendering court, under its own law, was incompetent to affect California
realty); Rozan v. Rozan,49 Cal. 2d 322,317 P.2d 11 (1957); Cuevas v. Cuevas,191 So.2d 843 (Miss.
1966); Farley v. Farley,19 Utah 2d 301,431 P.2d 133 (1967); Bailey v. Tully,242 Wis. 226,7 N.W.
2d 837 (1943). But see Noble v. Noble,26 Ariz. App. 89,546 P.2d 358 (1976); Farley v. Farley,227
Cal. App. 2d 1,38 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1964) (accepting principle but holding judgment in question not
entitled to enforcement); Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964). Other courts reach the
same results on grounds of comity. See, e.g., Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W, 127
(1919); Arthur v. Arthur,625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. App. 1981); McElreath v. McElreath,162 Tex. 190,
345 S.W.2d 722 (1961). Other courts continue to treat foreign land decrees as nullities. See, e.g.,
Wayne v. Reynolds,125 So.2d 223 (La. App. 1960); McLam v. McLam,85 N.M. 196,510 P.2d 914
(1973); Rozan v. Rozan,129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964). It is not clear what effect such decrees ought
to have. None of the cases or articles have addressed any situation other than an order to convey
land. None question the orthodox teaching that a foreign court may not affect title itself. All stress
the effectiveness of a foreign court-ordered conveyance if the defendant made the conveyance, Au
thors and courts rejecting the traditional rule argue that by giving effect to the conveyance, force is
given to the decree. Thus,they insist that failure to give effect to the decree absent the conveyance
exalts form over substance.
The counterargument, however, reflects the realities of the situation. The dilemma is raised be
cause the land and the defendant are in different states. A balance must be struck between the power
of the court of the land's location to control the land and the power of the court of the defendant's
location to control the defendant. Giving effect to the conveyance merely lets a court compel the
defendant to do what he is permitted to do by the law of the situs-transfer land by a conveyance
made elsewhere. This equitable power to compel a conveyance made elsewhere assumes that the
state of the situs will permit such land transfers. If the situs required all transfers to be executed
within its borders, no extraterritorial conveyance, whether judicially compelled or not, would be
valid. Cf McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825) (upholding Ohio's refusal to
recognize rights in Ohio land under a will probated in Pennsylvania in light of an Ohio statute
forbidding transfer of land by will unless the will was probated in Ohio). Thus,more accurately,the
issue is whether a facially valid conveyance wiII be rejected because a foreign court compelled it,and
not whether acceptance of the conveyance amounts to enforcing a foreign equitable decree,
The only basis that proponents of the enforcement of decrees suggest for a rejection of such a
conveyance is that the conveyance would be void for duress if compelled by a court whose decree
"did not deal rightfully and constitutionally with the title to domestic land." Barbour,supra, at 549,
The only authority that Professor Barbour cited for this proposition was Gilliland v. Inabnit, 92
Iowa 46, 60 N.W. 211 (1894),in which the court upheld a conveyance of Iowa land executed under
compulsion of a Kentucky court. The Iowa court relied on Massie v. Watts,10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148
(1810), and stressed that the Kentucky suit was not in rem as to Iowa land, but was to enforce a
personal obligation of the defendant who was subject to Kentucky's personal jurisdiction. The Gilli
land court determined that the foreign court did not affect the title in question, but only compelled
an individual subject to its jurisdiction to do something that he was entitled to do by the law of the
situs, i.e., execute a deed. The court did not consider any question other than the in personam
character of the suit and the Kentucky court's jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus, Professor
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torial action: a judicial decree that purports to affect the title to land
Barbour's reliance on Gilliland for his assertion that the foreign court dealt "rightfully and constitu
tionally with the title" is misplaced; because Gilliland was his sole authority for that assertion, his
assertion is questionable.
Interestingly, in this context the duress notion implies that regular legal proceedings against a
defendant subject to a court's jurisdiction can be labeled unlawful coercion by another court-an
idea that reverses full faith and credit. If the duress objection is rejected, however, Professor Bar
bour has no answer to the argument that the conveyance, not the decree, works the transfer, and that
recognizing the conveyance does not require recognizing the decree. Barbour, supra, at 549. See
also Currie, supra, at 628-29. Professor Lorenzen also asserts that recognizing the deed must imply
an ability in the coercing court to affect title, but he did not address the argument that recognition
only acknowledges the defendant's power to convey and the foreign court's power to control the
defendant. Lorenzen, supra, at 608.
No commentators supporting enforcement of foreign land decrees answer the question raised
when foreign decrees violate local law or policy. Professor Currie suggests that the state could act to
divest a defendant after enforcing the decree in his favor, but refers only to a single class of cases
those in which a defendant lacks capacity. Currie, supra, at 632-34. Professor Lorenzen suggests
that the problem is no different from that created by a conveyance pursuant to a decree incorrectly
reading local policy, but ignore the fact that the traditional rule forbids extraterritorial suits in most
cases. Lorenzen, supra, at 610. This rule necessarily means that such conveyances will issue only in
cases that are not local actions. Professor Reese merely relied on Professor Currie. Reese, supra, at
200.

Most fundamentally, the scholars ignore the basic difference between equitable nonmoney decrees
and judgments. When a state enforces a foreign judgment, it does so according to its own law.
Local law determines the manner of obtaining an execution and its consequences. The only real
consequence of the full faith and credit clause is that foreign judgments, once converted into local
judgments, are entitled to whatever consequences that the state has decided should follow from
Judgments. Enforcing a foreign nonmoney equity decree, however, must have consequences on the
ground in the enforcing state that a foreign court will determine. The foreign determination does not
merely trigger an execution process whose incidents are determined locally; it also dictates a particu
lar result. In effect, the foreign judge is deciding what particular events should happen within the
enforcmg state. With respect to a money judgment, the foreign court determines only that such
enforcement processes as the enforcing state has chosen shall be triggered. Given that distinction, it
is defensible for a state to limit its respect for foreign court actions to those producing conveyances
permitted by local law. Any other approach raises Dean Pound's question: "The result is to allow
one state through its courts to create real rights in land in another state-and if it may do so by its
courts, why not through its legislature?" Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-1919: Equity, 33
HARV. L. REV. 420, 424-25 (1920).
Professor Currie responds that a state is permitted to interpose its own public policy to avoid
enforcing foreign statutes but not foreign judgments. Currie, supra, at 660. The rationale for deny
mg public policy exceptions as to judgments, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), while permit
ting them as to statutes, however, may well be that local policy on execution determine in-state
consequences of enforcing a foreign judgment. Deference to foreign statutes eliminates any aspect of
local policy as to behavior in the state. Thus, foreign equitable decrees that dictate local behavior
resemble statutes far more than they resemble judgments.
Interestingly enough, none of the writers arguing for the effectiveness of foreign decrees contend
that they may take effect without local court action. Barbour, supra, at 548; Currie, supra, at 672;
Reese, supra, at 198. Similarly, courts calling foreign decrees effective acknowledge the need for
local court action. Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Arthur v. Arthur, 625
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located in another state. Such decrees can have consequences within the
forum state as well, for example, if all claimants are residents of the fo
rum state.52 But the courts treat any effects within the forum state as
incidental. The title transfer is the central issue. Whatever interest that
another state or its citizens may have in the land cannot affect the state's
authority to transfer the land through its courts.
B. Antisuit Injunctions
A second line of cases holding that a state lacks authority to control
events beyond its borders is that involving antisuit injunctions. Antisuit
injunctions forbid a particular individual to sue on a particular matter. If
a court of a state different from the forum state issues an antisuit injunc
tion, the forum court typically does not consider itself bound by the full
faith and credit clause to dismiss the suit.
The Illinois Supreme Court explained the rationale for this exception
to full faith and credit in James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad.53
First, the court noted that another state's statute limiting litigation of
transitory actions to its own courts was unconstitutional.54 The statutes
of one state cannot take away a second state's jurisdiction, even when the
first state created the original right of action.55 The James court further
noted that if statutes circumscribing the export of causes of action would
not be given extra-territorial effect, "it is hard to see why an equity de
cree should be entitled to any greater recognition."56 The court permit
ted a Michigan administrator who was seeking recovery under the
Michigan Wrongful Death Act to continue her suit in Illinois court
against an Illinois organization based on decedent's death in Michigan,
notwithstanding a Michigan antisuit injunction. 57
S.W.2d 592 (Ky. App. 1981); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1966); McElreath v.
McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961); Bailey v. Tully, 242 Wis. 226, 7 N.W.2d 837
(1943). Furthermore, the crux of the disagreement over such decrees is whether they more closely
resemble money judgments or legislation. See, e.g., Pound, supra, at 424-25. Proponents of recogni
tion of the decrees do not so much deny the impropriety of foreign legislation concerning local land
as they reject the analogy between legislation and the decrees. See Currie, supra, at 660.
52. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1980) (all claimants to the Connecticut land were
residents of South Carolina).
53. 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
54. Id. at 367, 152 N.E.2d at 864 (citing Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S.
354 (1914); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909)).
55. 233 U.S. at 360.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 357-67, 152 N.E.2d at 859-64.
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Similarly, in Abney v. Abney58 the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's retention of jurisdiction over a divorce action despite a Ten
nessee decree enjoining plaintiff from seeking an Indiana divorce because
he failed to comply with a Tennessee separate maintenance order. The
court noted the unanimity of the authorities on this point,59 and observed
that each state "has a legitimate interest in determining for itself the fair
ness or unfairness of any resort to its courts. "60 The court also stated
that the Supreme Court had upheld the jurisdiction of states to grant
divorces to nonresidents, and argued that another state's antisuit injunc
tion should not destroy this power.61
The rationale of these cases resembles that of the local action cases.
Recognition of the foreign decree is seen as foreign control of local judi
cial process. The courts assume that such control is improper and that
the foreign decree is not enforced. The courts held that a state's interest
in controlling litigation before its own courts and affecting its residents is
inadequate to permit one state to exercise authority over the courts of
another state. The key question is where the injunction would take ef
fect. Because the legal consequence is felt exclusively outside the forum
state, the forum state is without authority that another state must
respect.62
C.

Tax Jurisdiction Cases

Tax cases dealing with territorial limits on state jurisdiction are useful
to this analysis for three reasons. First, they provide another instance of
state assertions of authority being held unlawful because of their extra
territorial character. Second, the cases illustrate the connection between
an ultra vires analysis of extra-territorial state actions and the due pro
cess clause. Third, originally at least, the courts expressly framed their
results in terms of limits on state power generally, not simply in terms of
58. 176 Ind. App. 22, 374 N.E.2d 264 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
59. Id. at 25-28, 374 N.E.2d at 267-68.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. One may ask why injunctions against suits in other states are not considered void as beyond
the authority of the enjoining court. They are not so considered because the enjoining court has
authority over the defendant, and thus in a proper case can seek to control his conduct outside the
state. Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971). The state where the litigation is taking place
may deny the injunction full faith and credit because of its authority over its judicial proceedings.
Such a situation does not present a complete lack of authority in the enjoining state, but presents a
conflict of authority. The injunction therefore may be imprudent, but is not void.
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limits on tax jurisdiction, thus providing explicit support for the idea that
all assertions of state authority are subject to territorial limitations.
Tax laws that apply to out-of-state property or activity violate the due
process clause. 63 In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,64 the Supreme
63. Determining whether property is within the state is not always easy. Realty presents no
difficulty; a state's taxing power can be applied only to land within its borders. Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky,199 U.S. 194,204 (1905). Tangible personal property is treated as located
at the domicile of the owner, unless it is affirmatively shown to have acquired a situs elsewhere,
Central R.R. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962). If the property is shown to have been
permanently located outside the domiciliary state, however, it may be taxed only at its location.
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925). This approach to the location of these kinds of property
for tax purposes is consistent with the approach taken to locating such property in other areas of the
law. Thus, the local action rule requires that questions of realty title be adjudicated in the state of
location that is also the tax situs. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text. Similarly, just as
tangible personalty is taxed at its location, the state of its location controls its descent and distribu
tion upon the death of the owner. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112
(1934).
Complications arise, however, as to intangible property. The courts have long recognized that
because such "property" is simply the reification of relationships between people,it can have no situs
in fact. Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co.,255 N.Y. 120, 174 N.E. 299 (1931).
The courts have therefore been willing to acknowledge that an intangible may have more than one
situs. For example, corporate stock may be taxed at the state of the corporation's domicile, /11 re
Bronson,150 N.Y. 1,44 N.E. 707 (1896); or at the place at which the stock certificates are located,
In re Estate ofMaslowe, 119 Ill. App. 3d 776,457 N.E. 2d 151 (1983); or at the owner's domicile,
Curry v.Mccanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); or at all three places, State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Al
drich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942). This situation as far as it goes raises no question as to the principle
stated in the text because to tax intangibles is to tax a relationship,and relationships can touch more
than one state simultaneously.
Taxation of intangibles raises important questions as to the premise of this Article, however, in
light of rules regarding jurisdiction over intangibles for purposes other than taxation. Thus,in /11 re
De Lano's Estate,181 Kan. 729,315 P.2d 611 (1957),the court held that Kansas was without power
to administer that portion of a deceased Kansas domiciliary's estate that consisted of accounts in
Missouri banks and stock certificates and bonds physically inMissouri,though acknowledging Kan
sas' authority to tax the same property. This Article is premised on the assumption that state au
thority is essentially unitary,and that general rules of territorial limitation on state authority may be
abstracted from particular instances of limitation. The cases dealing with intangibles acknowledge
that state authority over an intangible for one purpose does not establish state authority for all
purposes. It could be argued,therefore,that differing degrees of authority over intangibles show that
authority is not unitary, and that the premise of this Article is false.
This argument is incorrect, however, because it does not reflect the particular characteristic of
intangibles that produces the apparent inconsistency. As noted above, intangibles are, simply, rela
tionships. Because a state is able to localize one aspect of a relationship for one purpose does not
prove that a court could localize other aspects of the relationship for other purposes. Consider, for
example, two different types of exercise of state authority, taxation and the administration of a dece
dent's estate. Taxation mechanically requires the state to send a tax notice and jurisdictionally re
quires a relationship between the taxed intangible and the state. Administration of an estate,
however, requires the administrator, exercising state authority, to act officially at the place where
acts necessary to possess the property can be taken. As the court observed in De Lano:
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Court noted the two due process limitations on a state's power to tax
interstate business: "First, no tax may be imposed unless there is some
minimal connection between those activities and the taxing State. . . .
Second, the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be ra
tionally related to 'values connected with the taxing State.' " 65 The state
prevailed on the tax question in Moorman-whether the formula that
Iowa used to determine the portion of a corporation's total income that
was subject to Iowa's income tax was constitutional.
In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 66
however, the Court stated that imposition of an apportionment formula
on appellant's property resulted in "gross overreaching, beyond the val
ues represented by the values purported to be taxed." 67 The Court held
that "[t]he taxation of property not located in the taxing State is constitu
tionally invalid, both because it imposes an illegitimate restraint on inter
state commerce and because it denies to the taxpayer the process that is
his due."68 The result in Norfolk & Western supports the proposition
that due process imposes limits on a state's power to tax and forbids
taxation of property beyond state territory.69 The cases indicate that
consistency of the tax with due process turns on "whether the tax in
Administration of estates involves more than merely interpreting wills and decreeing the
devolution of property. It also involves, among other things, the collection, inventory,
appraisal and sale of assets and the determination and payment of creditor's claims. How
is a Kansas domiciliary representative to collect a bank account held in a Missouri bank?
How is such a representative to collect on a promissory note which is held by another in a
different state? How is a bond to be collected when the certificate is not in Kansas? How is
stock to be transferred without possession of the certificate? How are any of them to be
mventoried and appraised in Kansas? Shall the domiciliary representative collect such
assets through the medium of midnight forays into other states? He has no other alterna
tive if other states, such as Missouri, choose to vest in their own courts control over such
assets.
181 Kan. at 749, 315 P.2d at 626.
In short, the fact that a state's authority over given intangibles varies depending on the type of
authonty exercised does not undercut this Article. Rather, it reflects the fact that different types of
authonty touch on different aspects of the relationship that is the intangible, and that the state
cannot necessarily characterize all aspects of that relationship as being within its borders merely
because it can plausibly localize some elements of the intangible.
64. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
65. Id. at 273. The Court relied on National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753, 756 (1967), for its first assertion, and on Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968), for its second.
66. 390 U.S. 317 (1968).
67 Id. at 326.
68 Id. at 325.
69. For authority supportmg this conclusion, see Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington
Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386
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practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection
conferred or afforded by the taxing State."70
Thus, the tax jurisdiction cases assume that authority to tax is depen
dent upon a link between the object taxed and the territory subject to the
taxing government. The determinative factor in these cases is the loca
tion of the item giving rise to liability, in this case the taxed property.
Moreover, examination of the chain of authority upon which the modem
due process tax decisions rest demonstrates that those decisions expressly
rely on cases dealing with the issue of tax jurisdiction as an ultra vires
problem.
The first links in the chain are Hays v. Pacific Steamship Co. 71 and St.
Louis v. The Wiggins Ferry Co. 72 In Hays and Ferry Co., the Supreme
Court viewed territorial limitations on state taxing authority as inherent
in the nature of the states' power and not simply as a function of the due
process clause. Hays most clearly illustrates this point because it held a
tax on out-of-state property to be beyond the state's jurisdiction fourteen
years before the due process clause was added to the Constitution. In
Hays, a New York steamship company sought recovery of taxes paid to a
California tax collector. The taxes had been assessed against plaintitrs
ships while they were in California to discharge passengers and cargo,
refit, and pick up more passengers and cargo. The Supreme Court held
that the tax was unlawful, observing that "the State of California had no
jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not,
properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the
other personal property of the State . . . . ,m
Similarly, in Ferry Co., the Supreme Court held that St. Louis was
without power to tax the value of ferry boats whose situs was in Illinois.
The Court concluded that jurisdiction to tax was limited by territorial
concerns:
U.S. 753 (1967); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340 (1954); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
70. Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325 n.5. In Miller Brothers v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954), the Court spoke of "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax." Id. at 344-45.
71. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
72. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1871), cited in Miller Bros. 347 U.S. at 342. Norfolk & Western, 390
U.S. at 324, relied on Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904), among others. Fargo, 193 U.S. at 499,
relied on Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891). The Car Co. case, 141 U.S.
at 23, relied on the Hays and Ferry Co. cases.
73. Hays, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 599.
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Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposi
tion of a tax would be ultra vires and void. If the legislature of a State
should enact that the citizens or property of another State or country
should be taxed in the same manner as the persons and property within its
own limits and subject to its authority, or in any manner whatsoever, such a
law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the most explicit consti
tutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislative as to
valid judicial action.74
Even though Ferry Co. was decided three years after the fourteenth
amendment was adopted, the Court's opinion made no reference to any
"explicit Constitutional inhibition" that supported its result. The briefs
in the case also did not connect the jurisdictional argument to due pro
cess. 75 Railroad Co. v. Jackson 76 was the only authority that the Courts
cited supporting its holding that a state's tax on property outside the
state was invalid,77 and that case did not refer to the fourteenth
amendment. 78
These three tax cases, taken together, support the legitimacy of an ul
tra vires approach to the reach of state authority. Hays must have relied
on such an approach because the fourteenth amendment did not yet ex
ist. Ferry Co. and Jackson also did not rely on the fourteenth amend
ment although it was available. Ferry Co. explicitly used an ultra vires
analysis, acknowledging no "explicit constitutional inhibition" to the tax
in question, fourteenth amendment or no fourteenth amendment. The
modem cases, on the other hand, label the problem as one of due process.
The due process violation here, however, as with personal jurisdiction,
74. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 430.
75. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff in Error; Brief for Defendant in Error, Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11
Wall) at 423.
76. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868).
77. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall) at 432.
78. Jackson involved the validity of a Pennsylvania tax imposed on bonds issued by a railroad
that operated in both Pennsylvania and Maryland. The Court held that taxing the bonds amounted
to taxing the property of the company issuing the bonds. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 267-68. The
Court held that the tax was invalid because it "[gave] effect to the acts of the legislature of Penn
sylvania upon property and interests lying beyond her jurisdiction." Id. at 268. The opinion did not
refer to the fourteenth amendment even though the case was decided after the amendment's effective
date. The arguments of counsel in Jackson did not rely on that amendment either, focusing instead
on the British nationality of the bondholder and Pennsylvania's alleged lack of authority to tax a
Maryland corporation. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 3-6; Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff in Error at
1-3; Statement of Defendant in Error at 1-2, Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 262.
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lies in the state's improper claim to authority. 79
Finally, the thrust of Ferry Co. is worth stressing. Clearly, to that
court, what was in issue was not some doctrine peculiar to tax cases. Tax
jurisdiction was seen simply as an aspect of a state's authority generally,
and the Court expressly equated tax jurisdiction with judicial jurisdic
tion, in language the Supreme Court has relied on as recently as 1954. 80
Thus, in enunciating territorial limits on the taxing power, the Court
applied a general restriction on state power to one of the manifestations
of that power. 81
D.

Criminal Law
The area of criminal subject-matter jurisdiction also supports the argu
ment that state authority is territorially limited. It further provides an
especially helpful example of what constitutes extra-territorial state ac
tivity. A basic principle of American law is that a state may not punish
nonresidents for crimes that they commit in other states. 82 Although
79. Professor Rheinstein noted this conclusion 30 years ago. Rheinstein,

Basis ofJurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 791-92 (1955).
SO. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342.

The Constitutional

81. This recognition of inherent territorial limits on state taxing power has implications for any
consideration of similar limitations on state judicial power. Surprisingly, few of the commentators
who have attacked a sovereignty-oriented analysis of jurisdiction address the implications of this
circumstance. Professor Redish, however, did so, but concluded that the tax cases lend no support
to such an analysis of personal jurisdiction.
Professor Redish's arguments offer various reasons to treat the sovereignty-oriented approach of
the tax jurisdiction cases as not supporting a similar approach to personal jurisdiction. He asserts
that there are "fundamental distinctions between [jurisdiction to tax] and the law of personal juris
diction." Redish, supra note 5, at 1126. The reasoning of the tax jurisdiction cases, however, does
not support this conclusion. On the contrary, in language relied on in Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342,
the Ferry Co. Court viewed jurisdiction to tax and judicial jurisdiction as different aspects of the
same problem. 78 U.S. at (11 Wall) 430. Professor Redish also distinguishes taxing jurisdiction
from personal jurisdiction by describing the results in the tax jurisdiction cases as "premised on the
reasonableness of a state's action in depriving individuals of property." Redish, supra note S, at
1129. If this is meant to suggest that this distinction justifies treating tax jurisdiction as raising
different due process questions than personal jurisdiction, it is incorrect. To the extent that Profes
sor Redish is suggesting that tax cases turn on reasonableness and personal jurisdiction cases do not,
it must be stressed that the key element of "reasonableness" in tax jurisdiction analysis is the territo
rial link between the state and either the taxpayer, the property, or the transaction. See supra notes
64-70 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if Professor Redish's contention is that the depri
vation of property is the key due process distinction between tax and judicial jurisdiction, his argu
ment fails because the assertion of judicial jurisdiction is the assertion of state authority to compel a
.defendant to give up his property.
82.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 118 (1972). This limitation
may not apply if the defendant is a citizen of the state. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
It is unclear whether states are forbidden to impose criminal penalties on nonresidents for acts done
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outside state territory but not in the territory of any other entity. In State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530
(Alaska 1976), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976), the Alaska Supreme
Court upheld, against a due process challenge, state statutes purporting to criminalize activities by
non-Alaskans taking place on the seas beyond Alaska's territorial waters. The statutes regulated
crab fishing in the areas in question, and could be violated by persons who never entered Alaska.
Certain of the defendants in Bundrant in fact were not shown to have performed any act in Alaska,
much less acts violating the statute. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the statute. The Court relied on
cases in which the defendant was either a citizen of the state whose criminal law was in issue, or in
which some element of the defendant's offense had occurred within the state, e.g., the defendant had
possessed within the state certain game in violation of a prohibition of possession within the state of
game taken outside the state in violation of state hunting restrictions. In all the cases relied upon,
the statutes were also justified as necessary to protect some clearly proper system of regulation, e.g.,
prohibitions of possession of game at certain seasons were needed to implement a state law limiting
local hunting seasons, because game taken in state could always be described as having been taken
elsewhere. See Silz v. Hesterburg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908). The Court emphasized the Supreme Court's
apparent acknowledgement in United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975), of the authority of a
coastal state to regulate fishing in the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea. The Court concluded
that Alaska's statute was justified as a conservation statute necessary to preserve an in-state resource.
There are a number of difficulties with Bundrant. Unlike the conservation cases relied upon, the
amount of crab fishing within Alaska's territorial waters was apparently small; the crabs passed the
early portion of their life cycles close to shore. The crabs migrated further out to sea as they ma
tured, not becoming commercially exploitable until they were at a stage of life typically spent beyond
Alaska's waters. The activity that the state sought to regulate, though very important to Alaska,
took place almost entirely on the high seas, and thus differs from the cases Bundrant cites, in which
the focus of regulation was an in-state activity. Further the court does not consider the significance
of the fact that all the other cases involved either citizens of the prosecuting state or offenses, one
element of which took place within the prosecuting state.
One should also note that the court in Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430 (D. Alaska 1976),
disagreed with the Alaska Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of the provisions. Hjelle, a
three-judge court decision granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the regulations
m Bundrant, held that the true purpose of the regulations was to regulate fishing outside Alaska,
because the actual amount of taking of crabs within Alaskan waters was very small. Given that fact,
the court held that the nexus between Alaska and the regulated activity was likely to be too weak to
withstand due process and commerce clause objections. Hjelle never proceeded to trial; proceedings
were stayed to allow the Alaska Supreme Court to deal with the Bundrant case, and Hjelle was
dismissed after Bundrant on the grounds that the two cases involved essentially the same parties and
the plaintiffs were not entitled to relitigate issues already decided in Bundrant. Hjelle v. Brooks, 424
F. Supp. 595 (D. Alaska 1976).
In light of the distinctions between the facts of Bundrant and the facts of the cases on which it
relies, and in light of the conflicting results of Bundrant and the first Hjelle case, it is doubtful
whether Bundrant was correctly decided. Assuming that it was, it does not conflict with the rule
stated m the text. Bundrant applied Alaskan law to acts on the high seas, le., an area not within the
Jurisdiction of any other state, American or foreign. Further, as Bundrant noted in its quotation
from United States v. Alaska, it is true that, as a matter of public international law, the authority of
coastal states to exercise a limited jurisdiction on the high seas adjacent to their territorial seas has
long been recognized. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). In effect, a coastal nation
1s permuted for some purposes to treat areas of the sea adjacent to its territory as though it were a
part of its territory, and one of those purposes is fishing. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v.
Ice.) 19741.C.J. 3; Art. 56, United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea, December 10, 1982,
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numerous cases assert the principle,83 the courts do not always state
whether the rule is one of construction only, inoperable in the event of a
clear legislative directive to the contrary, 84 or one that follows from state
or federal constitutional limits.85 Because states seldom seek to try per
sons for acts done elsewhere, the occasions for courts to pass on the ques
tion are limited. Authority nevertheless supports the proposition that a
state lacks the authority to criminalize activity within another jurisdic
tion. The cases asserting this rule have concluded that the state lacks
authority because the activity was outside the state's boundaries.86
For example, in State v. Cutshall, 87 the defendant had been convicted
under a statute that made bigamy a felony, even if the second marriage
occurred outside the state. 88 The second marriage in Cutshall had taken
place in South Carolina. The court held that North Carolina lacked
power to criminalize marriages in South Carolina. The court in part
rested its conclusion on a defendant's right, under North Carolina's Con
stitution, to a jury drawn from the vicinage in which the crime oc
curred.89 The right was denied by the statute because the North
Carolina courts could not empanel juries from South Carolina.90 The
court held that this denial of the "jury of the vicinage" right to a citizen
of South Carolina violated the privileges and immunities clause of the
federal constitution.9 1 This argument was based on limitations on North
Carolina's power imposed by its own law. The court, however, did not
rest its decision solely on this ground. It rejected, as a matter of basic
principles, the idea that a state could try an individual for an act done
21 I.L.M. 1261. Thus one could arguably see the area involved in Bundrant as part of Alaska for

some purposes.

83. People v. Buffum,40 Cal. 2d 709,256 P.2d 317 (1953); People v. Devine,185 Mich. 50,151
N.W. 646 (1915); State v. Kief, 12 Mont. 92,29 P. 654 (1892); Ex parte McNeely,36 W. Va. 84,14
S.E. 436 (1892). International law recognizes a piracy exception, between sovereign nations, to this
rule. Under this exception, any nation may capture pirates on the high seas whatever their national
ity. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 243-44 (1979). In the United
States,however,the power to punish pirates is committed exclusively to the federal government, See
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 147-50 (1933).
84. See People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953).
85. See infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
86. This rule appeared as early as 1799. State v. Knight, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 44 (1799).
87. 110 N.C. 538, 15 S.E. 261 (1892).
88. Id. at 540, 15 S.E. at 261.
89. Id. at 543-44, 15 S.E. at 262.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 550, 15 S.E. at 264.
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elsewhere.92
State v. Baldwin93 echoes the reasoning of Cutshall. In Baldwin, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered a rape case in which the state's
evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape had
occurred in Maine.94 The court referred to state statutes and case law for
the proposition that Maine's penal laws could not be applied to acts oc
curring outside Maine,95 but also asserted that other states would not be
obliged to give full faith and credit to Maine's judgments if the defendant's acts had not taken place in Maine.96 The Court concluded that a
person who had been convicted and had served a sentence in Maine for a
criminal act performed elsewhere could not plead double jeopardy if the
state in which the crime actually had occurred subsequently indicted
him. 97
Finally, the Supreme Court appears to have sanctioned the rule limit
ing application of a state's criminal law to acts within the state in Neilsen
v. Oregon.98 In Neilsen, the defendant, a Washington resident, operated a
purse net on the Washington side of the Columbia River, which forms
the boundary between Washington and Oregon, pursuant to a license is
sued by Washington authorities. Defendant was arrested and convicted
in Oregon of violating that state's prohibition on purse nets. Oregon
based its jurisdiction on the act of Congress admitting it to the Union.
The act conferred upon Oregon "concurrent jurisdiction" with any other
92. Id. at 543-45, 15 S.E. at 262-63. The court also noted that the extradition clause of the
federal constitution "excluded the idea of trying [defendants] outside of the limits of the state where
the offense 1s committed." Id. at 551-52, 15 S.E. at 265. The 1862 Indiana case of Johns v. State, 19
Ind. 421 (1862), also addressed the question whether an individual whose actions amounted to those
of an accessory before the fact to a felony committed in Indiana, but who never entered Indiana,
could be held to Indiana's laws. In reversing a judgment for conviction, the court held:
Each State, in respect to each of the others, is an independent sovereignty, possessing am
ple powers, and the exclusive right, to determine, within its own borders, what shall be
tolerated, and what prohibited; what shall be deemed innocent, and what criminal; its pow
ers bemg limited only by the Federal Constitution, and the nature and objects of govern
ment. While each State is thus sovereign within its own limits, it can not impose its laws
upon those outside of the limits of its sovereign power. Our own constitution has expressly
fixed the boundaries of its sovereignty.
Id. at 424.
93. 305 A.2d 555 (Me. 1973).
94. Id. at 557. The rape occurred in a remote area in the vicinity of the Maine-New Hampshire
border.
95. Id. at 559.
%. Id. at 560.
97. Id.
98. 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
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states that might be formed bordering the Columbia. 99
The Supreme Court held that Oregon could not prosecute an individ
ual who was not a resident of Oregon for an act authorized by the place
of acting, notwithstanding the congressional grant of concurrent jurisdic
tion.100 The Court's reasoning, however, is not clear. The result has two
possible explanations. First, the Court conceivably could have inter
preted the statute admitting Oregon to the union as limiting the state's
authority. Alternatively, the Court could have decided that the statute
simply did not apply to the situation; if so, it must have based its decision
on its belief that limits on state power exist wholly apart from statute.
The latter explanation is most consistent with the opinion. The Court
phrased the issue as whether "Oregon, by virtue of its concurrent juris
diction ... [can] practically override the legislation of Washington ...
?" 101 The Court did not view the statute as limiting Oregon's jurisdic
tion, but instead viewed it as a possible source of jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Court's holding that even the congressionally augmented jurisdiction
of Oregon could not reach the defendant a fortiori requires the conclu
sion that the Court believed that Oregon was unable to punish extra
territorial criminal acts through its normal jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why this was true, and iden
tified no express constitutional prohibition on Oregon's action. Rather,
the Court simply noted the potential for conflict between the two states
as follows:
It is not at all impossible that in some instances the interests of the two
States may be different. Certainly, as appears in the present case, the opin
ion of the legislatures of the two States is different, and the one State cannot
enforce its opinion against that of the other, at least as to an act done within
the limits of that other State. 102

A state, therefore, lacks authority to punish crimes committed beyond
its borders. This rule is implied in Cutshall, and is the most logical ex
planation for Neilsen. Baldwin also must be understood in this sense,
because its argument that a Maine conviction for a crime committed else
where would not be entitled to full faith and credit must mean that the
Maine court saw the territorial requirement as jurisdictional. If the loca
tion of the crime was irrelevant to Maine criminal jurisdiction, then the
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 316.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
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conviction presumably would be entitled to full faith and credit. 103
The question remains to be determined when a crime is committed
within the territory of a particular state. Obviously, different parts of a
crime can occur in more than one state, for example, Smith standing in
state A shoots Jones standing in state B. The modern rule is that a state
where any part of the crime occurs has jurisdiction to try the criminal;
the fact that effects of the crime are felt within the state does not provide
a basis for jurisdiction if the effect is not a part of the crime. 104 Nor is the
defendant's awareness of the locus of the crime important. Apparently,
the state must only prove that the crime occurred in the state; proof that
the defendant intended the crime to take place in the state, or was aware
of its locus, is not required. 105
E. Implications
The foregoing discussion makes clear that, with respect to a number of
areas of the law, the Supreme Court views the states or the states view
themselves as unable to take actions that would amount to exercising
authority over matters not concerned with their territory. These cases
are concrete examples of territorial limitations on state sovereignty. The
question now becomes that of identifying the general limitations on state
sovereignty and the specific limitations on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
103. The law of extradition,under which one state may not be compelled to extradite a fugitive
to another state reinforces this view. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860); South Dakota v.
Brown, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758, 576 P.2d 473 (1978).
104. State v. Duffy, 124 Ariz. 267, 603 P.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1979); Gardner v. State, 263 Ark.
739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. den., 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Conrad v. State, 262 Ind. 446, 317
N.E.2d 789 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bighum,452 Pa. 554,307 A.2d 255 (1973); State v. Klein, 4
Wash. App. 736,484 P.2d 455 (1971). Cases sometimes state that a state also has jurisdiction if the
effects of the defendant's acts are felt within the state. Examination of such cases reveals, however,
that the effect referred to is itself a part of the crime. Strassheim v. Daily,221 U.S. 280,284 (1911)
(crime 1s obtaining money from state government by false pretenses through delivery of used instead
of new machinery; delivery in state); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 360 Mass. 580, 276 N.E.2d 705
(1971) (crime is larceny,defined as including asportation; stolen money possessed in state); State v.
Darroch,305 N.C. 196,287 S.E. 2d 856 (1982), cert. den., 457 U.S. 1138 (crime is accessory before
the fact to murder; murder in state). Thus an older New York case holds as not within New York's
1un,d1ction a fraud committed in London upon a branch of a New York corporation. People v.
Werblow. 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925). The fact that the New York firm ultimately bore the
loss was held inadequate to make the fraud one '"affect[ing] persons or property" within New York.
Id. at 67-68, 148 N.E. at 791-92.
105. State v. Vickers, 18 Wash. App. 111, 567 P.2d 675 (1977) (crime committed on bridge
between Washington and Oregon; Washington jurisdiction upheld with evidence offered only on
locus of crime).
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At a minimum, the foregoing examples strongly suggest that courts
understand that territorial considerations limit state sovereignty. All of
the limitations on state authority trace back to the common basic princi
ples that the sovereignty of other states limits a state's authority and that
a state's authority extends only to that which affects its territory. Thus
the local action rule is a manifestation of a state's sovereign authority to
control local land. Foreign antisuit injunctions are denied full faith and
credit as interferences with a state's control of its own courts. The
Supreme Court expressly couples authority to tax with authority to as
sert judicial jurisdiction and territorial considerations. Criminalization
by one state of acts within another state's territory is an effort to ignore
the sovereignty of the other and is therefore beyond the power of the first
state. Reading these areas of the law together clearly reveals a common
basic principle: a state's authority is limited to controlling transactions,
things and people connected with its territory.
Given this general principle, the assertion that territorial considera
tions limit personal jurisdiction follows. An assertion of personal juris
diction is an assertion of authority. The state does not simply invite
defendants to participate in a civil suit; it orders them to do so. Further
more, the assertion of authority extends beyond compelling the defend
ant to litigate; the state claims the authority to decide the legal effects of
particular acts or omissions. In effect, by asserting jurisdiction, the state
is claiming authority to regulate the transaction that is the subject of the
lawsuit. Because the state is exerting its authority when it asserts per
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant and because examination of other ar
eas of the law reveals an underlying assumption that a state may not
exercise authority over people or events not connected with its territory,
it follows that territorial limitations on sovereignty apply to the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.
This conclusion is of limited value, however, unless the content of such
territorially based limitations on jurisdiction are delineated. For exam
ple, a state's connection with one of its residents is sufficient to justify
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the resident regarding transactions
not connected with the state. 106 One could argue that, given this close
connection between the state and its residents, contact with the residents
amounts to contact with the state and that the state could therefore as
sert personal jurisdiction over anyone dealing with one of its residents.
106. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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This point is raised to indicate the potential breadth of jurisdictional cat
egories that could be brought within the territorial framework.
Analysis of the limitations on state authority relative to the other areas
of the law does permit, however, some conclusions as to the content of
territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction.
First, if the defendant is a citizen or resident of the state, the state is
authorized to assert jurisdiction over him. Courts have upheld this prin
ciple in the most directly analogous situation, criminal law. 107 A prob
lem is presented by nonresident defendants who are casually present in
the state and who are sued there regarding matters completely unrelated
to the forum. Although assertion of jurisdiction in such circumstances is
questionable as based on a connection that is neither continuing nor re
lated to the state's regulatory interests, territory-based limitations would
not divest the state of the power to regulate the conduct of all persons
actually within its borders at the time of regulation.
If the defendant, on the other hand, is a nonresident not present in the
state, the state cannot look to either a continuing or a current connection
to the state's territory as a basis of authority for determining the legal
effect of his actions. The state must therefore base any authority that it
asserts on some past connection, and the problem becomes that of identi
fying the past connections adequate to support the state's assertion. In
those areas of the law discussed previously, the focus in determining state
authority with respect to nonresidents was on the connection between the
state and the item or transaction to be regulated. The analysis did not
look to the persons affected by the item or transaction.
For example, in the antisuit injunctions context, the injunctions were
related to legal proceedings in the foreign state and often were obtained
by residents of that state. The forum state, however, focused on the fact
that the injunction sought to regulate a legal proceeding within the fo
rum, and refused to enforce the injunction. The courts simply ignored
the real connections between the injunction and the foreign state, focus
ing on the connections (or lack of them) between the foreign state and
the object of its attempts at regulation, the local court system. Similarly
the local action cases rejected foreign efforts to regulate local property.
Residents of foreign states may have an interest in local property, but
foreign states are, nonetheless, not permitted to control local real estate.
Again in criminal cases, the focus is on the location of the crime. Ap107. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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parently, no state has ever sought to apply its law to a crime merely
because the victim was a resident of the state. To be sure, there are states
that apply their criminal law to defendants whose acts take place in other
states. In such cases, however, some part of the transaction upon which
defendant's liability depends has taken place in the forum state, and the
jurisdiction over the defendant is based on the state's authority to regu
late the event in its territory that forms part of defendant's crime. 108
The focus is on whether the item or event to be regulated is at least
partly local. A state cannot regulate foreign court proceedings, establish
foreign land titles, tax foreign property, or pass on the criminality of
transactions occurring elsewhere. The state is precluded from such exer
cise of power even if the state, or local residents, would benefit from such
regulation.
This model then sets out the general rule that a state's sovereignty is
territorially limited. Applying the model to the assertion of personal ju
risdiction, exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident not present in the
state must depend on whether some part of the event or transaction on
which the defendant's liability depends occurs in the state. If the case
involves a contract, some part of the negotiation or performance must
have occurred in the state. If the case involves a tort, some act on which
defendant's liability depends must occur in the state.
This rule seems to fit most closely with the more general pattern evi
denced by the areas of law discussed above. In all of those, state author
ity turns on whether the state seeks to regulate local conduct, events or
things, or to regulate conduct, transactions or things located someplace
else. If in a contract action the state takes jurisdiction when the contract
is partly negotiated or performed in the state, it seeks only to attach legal
consequences to a transaction being carried out locally. If, in a tort case,
a state is the scene either of defendant's act or of the liability-producing
effect of that act, the state is regulating either local conduct or local
events.
Local presence of at least part of transactions, conduct or events is not
merely sufficient, but is necessary to permit the state to assert jurisdic
tion. For if all of the determinants of a nonresident defendant's liability
took place outside the state, the state's assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant is a claim to regulate activities that did not take place within
the state. The question cannot be whether effects of defendant's acts are
108. See, W. LAFAVE & A. ScoIT, supra note 82 at 118-25.
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felt in the state if those effects are irrelevant to the question of whether or
not he has broken the law. To say that particular effects are irrelevant to
liability is to say that they are not the events that the law seeks to regu
late in establishing a rule of liability. And, as in the areas of the law
previously discussed, the key is the location of the object of or occasion
for regulation. The test for personal jurisdiction therefore cannot be
whether the defendant's conduct causes local "effects" if personal juris
diction rules are to be consistent with general limitations on state sover
eignty. The test instead must be whether what happened locally is itself
an object of or at least part of an occasion for regulation by the state. 109
This argument is consistent with World-Wide in deducing limits on
personal jurisdiction from the limits on state sovereignty inherent in the
United States governmental structure. In World-Wide, however, the
Court held that Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction denied the defend
ants due process, even though the liability-producing event took place
within Oklahoma, because defendant's contacts with Oklahoma were in
no sense purposeful. The Court insisted that the only contacts adequate
to support jurisdiction were intentional contacts. This intent require
ment, however, does not follow as a matter of logic from territorial con
siderations. Intent plays no role in determining state jurisdiction in the
areas of the law previously discussed, possibly because the connections
upon which most of those cases focus cannot exist without intent. One
cannot unintentionally own property in the place where the property is
located. But even in the area of criminal law, the cases apparently do not
focus on defendant's intent to act within the state, but only on whether
he in fact did act within the state. 110 If personal jurisdiction rules follow
the same restrictions imposed generally on exercises of sovereignty, in
tent limitations on personal jurisdiction cannot be justified.
Indeed, the intent requirement could produce anomalous results. Con
sider a variation on the World-Wide facts. Suppose the purchase of the
car and the subsequent injury took place exactly as in the original case,
except that Seaway's officers and employees, because of a grudge against
the Robinsons, sold them a car known to be very dangerously defective.
109. Professor Brilmayer has also stressed the importance of regulable activity within the state to
1unsdict1onal analysis. She addresses the issue in a slightly different context than does this Article.
Her approach describes contacts that could be seen as "related" to a cause of action. She does note,
nonetheles�. the connection between regulatable activity and territorial sovereignty. Brilmayer,
supra note 33, at 80-88.
110. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1980); State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555 (Me.
1973).
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Seaway intended injury to the Robinsons when the defect manifested it
self, but had no particular reason to believe that the car would be outside
New York when that happened. Assuming arguendo that the harm from
the defect occurred in Oklahoma, Oklahoma could assert criminal juris
diction over those responsible for the sale, obtaining custody through ex
tradition. Under World-Wide, however, Oklahoma could not force
Seaway to respond to a claim for civil damages.
The World-Wide rule means that if the liability-producing effects of
the tortfeasor's conduct occur in a state with which the tortfeasor did not
seek contact, that state may not regulate his conduct despite the con
duct's connection with in-state events that are proper subjects of regula
tion. Thus the Court by requiring purposeful contact as the basis for
personal jurisdiction is in effect discarding the territorial sovereignty
model that it claims to be applying. The logic of territorial limitations on
state sovereignty dictates that the occurrence within the state of a regul
able event should create authority to regulate the conduct causing the
event. The Court, however, refuses to permit the states to exercise au
thority in such circumstances because of a purposeful contact require
ment completely unrelated to the issue of regulability.11 1
In summary, the argument to this point is as follows: the United
States is a federation, the units of which-the states-are independent of
111. Professor Brilmayer sought to justify the Supreme Court's intent requirement by pointing
to the loss distribution consequences of a state's asserting jurisdiction over defendants whose con
tacts with the state are fortuitous. Focusing on commercial defendants, she argues that eliminating
any intent requirement by employing what she calls a strict liability approach to jurisdiction would
permit a state to exceed its sovereign authority because a defendant in such a case will seek to spread
any damages that it is obliged to pay over all of the consumers with whom it deals. If the defend
ant's contacts with the state are so slight as not to satisfy a purposeful contact standard of jurisdic
tion, she argues, it is likely that the market that the defendant normally serves will consist primarily
of persons in states other than the forum. Thus the consequence of the state taking jurisdiction over
the defendant is that any loss the defendant suffers will ultimately be borne by persons not subject to
the state's sovereignty. Brilmayer, supra note 33 at 95-96.
This argument, however, proves too much. Any time a state asserts jurisdiction over an out-of.
state entity doing little business in the state, the defendant will spread his loss primarily over out-of.
state consumers. Those consumers' contact with the state in such circumstances are likely to be
nonexistent, whether the defendant's contacts with the state are fortuitous or whether they arc direct
and intentional. If states are barred from taking jurisdiction whenever loss would fall primarily on
out-of-state consumers, then assertions of jurisdiction over primarily out-of-state businesses will al
ways be unconstitutional. Yet the courts do not adhere to such a strict rule. The more logical
argument is that if a state is permitted to attach legal consequences to the unintended, unforeseen
effects of out-of-state activity, then the state may assert jurisdiction over the persons causing those
effects. The event is regulable and within the state's borders and, under the examples discussed, that
should suffice to bring the event within the jurisdiction of the state's courts.
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one another and, to a very great extent, of the central government. In
particular, each controls its own judicial system, except to the extent that
the Supreme Court has the last word on matters of federal law. The
courts have treated the independence of the states as necessarily imply
ing, as a matter of law, territorial limitations on state authority. Exercise
of personal jurisdiction is, of course, exercise of state authority. There
fore, because sovereignty considerations lead to the conclusion that all
state authority is territorially limited, it follows that one aspect of that
authority, the exercise of personal jurisdiction, is similarly limited. Fur
thermore, the form that the limitations take is permitting states to apply
their authority only when the object of or at least part of the occasion for
regulation is within state territory. Applying the general limitations on
sovereignty to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction, states may assert such
jurisdiction over nonresidents outside the state-who because of their
nonresidence are not subject to the state's authority in any personal ca
pacity-only if the transactions, acts or events whose legal effect that the
state claims authority to declare took place within the state.112
112. The textual discussion argues that, given the apparently generally accepted limitations on
state sovereignty, one can deduce from those limitations the reach of the judicial jurisdiction of the
states. That discussion seeks to make its point simply by reliance on logic and American case law.
Further confirmation is available, however, because the United States is not the only country in
the world that is structured as a federation, with the units of the federation enjoying autonomy as to
their judicial systems. Canada and Australia resemble the United States in this regard. Further, the
members of the European Economic Community (EEC), though not parts of a single country, have
by treaty accepted among themselves limitations on their jurisdiction over one another's domiciliar
ies. Thus, if these entities' approach to personal jurisdiction were very different from that argued
here despite the similarity in organization, the argument that limitations on personal jurisdiction
flow from structural/federalism concerns would be weakened. In fact, however, those entities' juris
dictional systems resemble the pattern described above. To be sure, this resemblance does not prove
the logical necessity of the conclusion that this Article has reached; coincidence is always possible.
The similarity, however, lends support to this Article's argument, and is therefore worth describing.
Both the Canadian and Australian jurisdictional systems resemble the United States in being fed
erations that divide governmental responsibilities between the central government and the govern
ments of semi-autonomous territorial units that compose the federation. R. CHEFFINS & R.
TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS OF CANADA 16-31 (1976); W. WYNES, LEGISLATIVE,
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS IN AUSTRALIA 15 (1976). In particular, the courts of each unit
are viewed as parts of the governments of the units, not as elements of a single, national judiciary. J.
LYON & R. ATKEY, CANADIAN CoNsrITUTIONAL LAW IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 173 (1970);
R. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUSTRA·
LIA, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 41-42 (1960).
The similarities between the three countries, however, do not extend to their formal constitutional
arrangements for the treatment of judgments from the courts of any given unit in the courts of sister
umts. The United States Constitution includes the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST. art IV,
§ I. Canada's constitution, The British North American Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch. 3, contains
no similar clause. Instead, it expressly allocates to the provinces authority to make laws governing
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RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST A TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS

Many American commentators argue that the limitations on the exer
cise of personal jurisdiction should not be deduced from the fact that
the treatment of judgments from other provinces. Id., § 92 class 14. Australia's constitution con
tains a full faith and credit clause, AusTL. CoNsr. § 118, as well as a provision authorizing the
federal parliament to make laws concerning both the service of civil process and the execution of the
judgments of the courts of the Australian states. Id.,§ 51 (xxiv). This clause permits federal statu
tory extension of the territorial effectiveness of the state courts' process to create extrastate jurisdic
tion. Ex parte Iskra, 63 N.S.W. St. R. 538 (1963). The Service and Execution of Process Act
implemented this clause. 10 AuSTL. ACTS. P. 1901-1973, 837 (Service Act).
Turning to the jurisdictional rules, and considering Canada first, one immediate problem is deter
mining which jurisdictional rules to examine, because all Canadian provinces claim a much broader
jurisdiction themselves than they recognize in sister provinces. Compare B.C. CT. R. 13 (3)(4) will,
Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, pt. 2 (1979) and N.S.R. PRACT. 10.08 with
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, N.S. STAT. ch. 13 (1973). While arguments exist on
both sides, on balance the jurisdictional standard applied to foreign judgments seems closely analo
gous in function to the American due process standard. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-33
(1877). Focusing on that standard, all Canadian provinces have chosen to limit strictly the range of
action of the courts of sister provinces. All of the provinces base the enforceability of sister province
judgments on whether personal jurisdiction exists and apply restrictive jurisdictional tests. Under
common-law rules followed throughout Canada, a court's jurisdiction to enter an enforceable judg
ment is recognized in a sister province only if the defendant was present, resident, or domiciled in
the province rendering judgment, 1 J. G. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 426 (1974), at
the time process was served. Re McTavish and Hampton & Securities & Investments Ltd., 150
D.L.R. 3d 27 (Alta. Q.B. 1983); Rafferty's Restaurants Ltd. v. Sawchuk, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 261
(Man. Cty. Ct.)., contra Weigand v. Calgary Joint Ventures Ltd., [1979] 2 W.W.R. 671 (Alta.) A
corporation is considered present in a province if it is carrying on business there, 1 J.G. CASTEL,
supra, at 431, defined in terms substantially equivalent to "doing business" in American terminol
ogy, McClellan v. Elwood's Ltd., 30 N.B.2d 358 (Q.B. 1980). All Canadian common-law provinces
have enacted the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, providing for the enforcement in one
province of judgments rendered in another. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA),
ALTA. REV. STAT. ch. R-6 (1980); Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, pt. 2
(1979); REJA, MAN. REV. STAT. ch. J-20 (1979); REJA, N.B. REV. STAT. ch. R-3 (1973), read with
Foreign Judgments Act, N.B. REV. STAT. ch. F-19 (1973); REJA, NFLD. REV. STAT. ch. 327
(1970); REJA, N.S. STAT. ch. 13 (1973); REJA, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 432 (1980); REJA, P.E.I.
REv. STAT. ch. R-7 (1974); REJA, SASK. REv. STAT. ch. R-3 (1978). The jurisdictional provisions
of the Act, however, differ from those of the common law in only two respects: the Act does not
permit jurisdiction over a natural person to be based on presence alone, and allows jurisdiction over
an artificial person based upon carrying on business. See, e.g., REJA, MAN. REV. STAT. ch. J-20,
§ 3(6) (1970). The courts have held that the Act was not intended to change substantially the com
mon-law rules on enforcement of judgments. Rafferty's Restaurants Ltd., [1983] 3 W.W.R. at 26970.
Thus, Canada's provinces have limited one another's jurisdiction severely, with the exception of
jurisdiction over extra-provincial defendants who own property in the province rendering judgment.
Jurisdiction absolutely depends on physical connection with provincial territory. All transactional
bases of jurisdiction, such as the commission of a tort within the rendering province, are deemed
inadequate to support enforcement of a foreign judgment. Clearly, this approach is consistent with
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this Article's basic argument, that jurisdiction depends on territorial sovereignty, although it is a
most rigid application of that theory.
Australia presents a more complicated situation. The Australian Parliament is constitutionally
authonzed to enact, and has enacted, legislation concerning both service of process and execution of
judgments of state courts. The Australian states have each also provided for extrastate service,
judgments obtained under such state provisions being enforceable under Part IV of the Service Act,
which permits no jurisdictional challenges to judgments. E. SYKES, A TEXTBOOK ON THE AUSTRA
LIAN CONFLICT OF LAW 362-66 (1972). Therefore, it is necessary to consider not only the Service
Act's provisions for extrastate service, but also the analogous Jaw of the individual states.
Read together, the Service Act, § 11(1), and the various state provisions, Supreme Court Act 52
1970, N.S.W. PUB. ACTS, sched 4, Part 10, § I; Queensl. S. Ct. R. 0. 11, R. l; S. Austl. S.Ct. R. 0.
11, R. I; Tasm. S.Ct. R.O. 11, R. I; Viet. S.Ct. R.O. 11, R. I; W. Austl. S.Ct. R. 0. 10, R. I, permit
assertion of jurisdiction over defendants in those situations commonly permitted in the United
States, e.g., local residence or domicile, suits on contracts made or breached within the state, suits on
local torts, etc. The fairly common Australian provisions permitting jurisdiction over suits on con
tracts governed by local Jaw have few American analogies, though such provisions fit into American
concepts on the theory that, given the established character of such provisions, election that a con
tract be governed by a particular state's Jaw amounts to consent to that state's jurisdiction. Other
categories of provision common in Australia but not in the United States are those establishing
jurisdiction over persons who are "necessary or proper parties" to suits already commenced against
someone else who has been properly served, and over persons liable to indemnify one properly sued
in the state. While such provisions are difficult to reconcile with the analysis of this Article, one
must assume that some defendants subjected to jurisdiction as necessary parties or indemnitors,
could be reached on some other theory. The Australian provision that most clearly is inconsistent
with the approach of this Article is one in New South Wales permitting a suit based on local damage
from a tort committed anywhere. Supreme Court Act 1970, N.S.W. PUB. ACTS, sched. 4, Part 10,
§ l(e). As construed by New South Wales courts, any local harm whatever suffices to satisfy the
statute; the statute is not limited in its application to such local damage that completes liability.
Challenor v. Douglas, [1983] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 405.
Australia's statutes basically reflect the same sort of territorial orientation taken in World-Wide
and in this Article. Court decisions that hold the validity of state jurisdictional provisions depend on
a showing of a nexus between the state, the defendant and the subject of the litigation reinforce this
orientation. The nexus requirement is in turn based on the argument that jurisdiction asserted by a
legislature whose authority is limited by territorial considerations must satisfy those considerations.
Cotter v. Workman, 20 F.L.R. 318, 325-27 (A.C.T. Sup. Ct. 1972). Accord Baldry v. Jackson,
[1977] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 494 (C.L. Div.). Presumably for this reason, the Cha/lenor court, which con
strued the New South Wales 'local harm' provision, observed in dictum that, construed as basing
Jurisdiction on local damage not required to establish liability, the rule was at least arguably ultra
v1res. New South Wales, Cha/lenor, [1983], 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 419.
Thus, Australia takes an approach to jurisdiction that focuses on territorial sovereignty. This is
particularly significant because the Australian constitutional provision permitting federal legislation
to extend the reach of state process could presumably be used to eliminate the need for Australia to
adopt such an approach. This has not, however, been done.
Jurisdiction in the EEC, as in Canada and Australia, reflects a territorial orientation. The EEC is
not one country, but its members have by treaty limited their courts' jurisdiction over one another's
domiciliaries. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer
cial Matters, as amended, 21 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L. 304) 1 (1978). This development cannot be
ascribed to difficulties in enforcing judgments in countries other than the one rendering judgment,
because the same treaty provides an essentially automatic method of enforcing in any EEC country,
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American federalism assumes territorial limitations on state authority.113
The following sections respond briefly to various arguments either chal
lenging the territorial approach to jurisdiction or proposing substitutes
for it.
A.

The Inappropriateness of Territorial Analysis

One might argue that territorial jurisdiction analysis is fundamentally
unsound for a number of reasons. First, it deals with excessive assertions
of personal jurisdiction as ultra vires. In apparent contradiction, many
courts have held that such assertions of jurisdictions violate the foura judgment obtained in any other EEC country. Id. at 78. The EEC's territorial approach to juris
diction, therefore, cannot be attributed to problems of enforcement nor can it be disputed.
Thus, the Convention rejects several bases of jurisdiction previously employed in some of the
signatory countries that would be irreconcilable with the territorial approach to jurisdiction de
scribed in Part II of this Article. France is forbidden to take jurisdiction of a case solely because the
plaintiff is a French national. Germany may not claim personal jurisdiction over persons merely
because they own property in Germany. The Netherlands may not take jurisdiction over a case
merely because the plaintiff resides in the Netherlands. Id. art. 3. The Convention's rule is that
persons should be sued in the country in which they are domiciled, id. art. 2, but it also establishes a
number of special jurisdictional bases. All defendants in a case may be sued at the domicile of any
one of them, id. art. 6(1); third-party defendants may be sued in the court in which the original suit
is being heard, id. art. 6(2); contract cases generally may be brought at the place of performance of
the contract, id. art. 5(1); a consumer may sue on consumer contracts at his own domicile, if the
contract involved installment payments, or relates to financing of a goods purchase, or was solicited
at his domicile and he concluded the contract there, id. arts. 13, 14; and tort suits may be brought in
the country in which the "harmful event" occurred, id. art. 5(3). One should note that this tort
provision has been interpreted to permit suit either at the place where the defendant did the act
giving rise to the harm or at the place where the plaintiff felt the harm. The latter apparently is
appropriate whether or not harm was foreseeable at that place. Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v.
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735, 1748-49 (Preliminary Ruling),
[1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 284, 301. The courts have not addressed the question of whether the
local harm to which the treaty refers is such harm as is needed to complete the tort, or, instead, any
local harm at all.
Thus the EEC adhered to a territorial approach to personal jurisdiction. The principal exceptions
to this generalization are the Convention's permitting jurisdiction over multiple defendants at the
domicile of any one, and over third-party defendants at the site of the main suit. More striking than
these departures from strict territoriality is the Convention's general adherence to the territorial
approach, despite the EEC's absolute freedom to select any approach to jurisdiction it chose.
In summary, this brief examination of three entities with structures resembling that of the United
States reveals approaches to jurisdiction generally consistent with the analysis of this Article, Can
ada, Australia (except possibly New South Wales) and ·the EEC all demand either local affiliations or
local events related to liability before asserting jurisdiction over a defendant.
113. See generally Braveman, supra note 5; Gottlieb, supra note 5; Jay, supra note 5; Redish,
supra note 5; Silberman, supra note 7; von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg
ments- General Theory a11d the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, 167 RECEUIL DES CoURS 9
(1980).
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teenth amendment's due process clause, and therefore are not entitled to
full faith and credit under the full faith and credit clause. In fact there is
no contradiction. Rather, the due process violation derives from the very
fact that such an assertion of jurisdiction is ultra vires. This is the thrust
of Pennoyer v. Neff, the first case asserting that an excessive claim of
personal jurisdiction denies due process.114 The denial of due process lies
not in some particular unfairness in the proceedings, but in the fact that
the proceedings are illegitimate as beyond the state's authority. The due
process clause should be understood as protecting not only the individ
ual's rights to notice, hearing, an unbiased decision-maker, but also his
"interest in freedom from an unrelated sovereign."115 This absorption
into the due process clause of limitations on state authority derived from
limitations on territorial sovereignty is not unique to personal jurisdic
tion analysis. As seen above, in the area of state jurisdiction to tax, the
Supreme Court has held state actions to be due process violations essen
tially on ultra vires grounds.116
This federalism-related analysis of personal jurisdiction might also
seem inconsistent with certain language in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie Des Bauxities De Guinee.111 The Supreme Court in Insur
ance Corp. affirmed the district court's holding that, because personal
jurisdiction limitations protect only individual liberty interests, individu
als may waive or be estopped from raising them.118 In the course of its
discussion, the Court described the personal jurisdiction requirement as
restricting judicial power "not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter
of individual liberty."119 Certainly, this language suggests that the Court
sees personal jurisdiction limitations as unrelated to sovereignty consid
erations. If that reading is correct, then the analysis in this Article con
tradicts Insurance Corp. and is therefore questionable. Several reasons
exist, however, to doubt the correctness of that reading, including the
context of the Court's statement, the accompanying text and footnotes,
and the nature of sovereignty.
The context of the Court's statement demonstrates that Insurance
Corp. was more concerned with explaining what personal jurisdiction
114.
115.
(1983).
116.
117.
118.
119.

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729-33.
Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68
See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
456 U.S. 694 (1982).

Id. at 702-07.
Id. at 702.

IOWA

L. REV. 1015, 1047
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was not, than with what personal jurisdiction was. The statement occurs
in the course of a discussion in which the Court seeks to establish the
waivability of personal jurisdiction limitations. More specifically, it fol
lows a portion of that discussion describing subject matter jurisdiction as
contributing to the "characterization of the federal sovereign" and there
fore as not waivable by the parties.120 The statement is part of a para
graph distinguishing personal jurisdiction from subject-matter
jurisdiction on the ground that the former involves only a personal lib
erty interest.121 Clearly, the Court's focus is simply on establishing that
personal jurisdiction may be waived; unlike World-Wide, the opinion is
not a general exploration of the rationale and limits of personal jurisdic
tion, and should not be read as such.
Aside from considering its context, the Court's statement must be read
in conjunction with a footnote appended to it, which is reproduced be
low. 122 In that footnote, the Court acknowledged that World-Wide
stated that personal jurisdiction reflects the "character of state sover
eignty," reaffirmed without description the minimum contacts test, and
stated that "the restriction on state sovereign power described in World
Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function
120. Id. at 701-02.
121. Id. at 702-03.
122. It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to
state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other
states. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980),
we stated:
"[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so
long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State. The
concept of minimum contacts, in tum, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguish·
able, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system."
Contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 713-714, our holding today
does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident
defendant and the forum State. Rather, our holding deals with how the facts needed to
show those "minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with
court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sovereign power described in World·
Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction
on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdic
tion requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
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of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause." 123
This footnote argues strongly against the proposition that the Insur
ance Corp. Court intended to say that personal jurisdiction has nothing
to do with territorial sovereignty. If that is what the Court meant to do,
one would expect its footnote to characterize World-Wide's rationale as
incorrect. The footnote, however, does not. Moreover, in reaffirming
World-Wide's minimum contacts test, 124 the Court could not have meant
simultaneously to sever sovereignty considerations from personal juris
diction. This follows because, according to World-Wide, sovereignty lim
itations compel the minimum contacts test. If the Court had reaffirmed
the test while rejecting the relevance of sovereignty to personal jurisdic
tion, it would have proclaimed a jurisdictional standard while simultane
ously destroying the rationale for that standard. Finally, the Court in its
footnote affirms the link between sovereignty and personal jurisdiction.
Although the Court's exact meaning in labelling sovereignty restrictions
"a function" of individual liberty interests is unclear, the language must
mean that sovereignty restrictions are relevant to the personal jurisdic
tion rules protecting the liberty interest in question.
The language in the text of the Court's opinion, however, must have
some meaning. If as suggested here, a close reading of the accompanying
footnote requires a rejection of the apparent meaning of that language, it
is necessary to indicate what it does mean. This meaning can be deter
mined; all that is required is a consideration of context.
The statement follows a discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction, limi
tations on which are described as flowing necessarily from limitations on
federal sovereignty. The best way to understand the Court's text lan
guage, therefore, is to read the language as though the Court had said
that personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not
as a matter of sovereignty in the same sense that subject-matter jurisdic
tion restrictions are a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty." The language in the appended footnote that rejects the idea that
federalism is "an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the
123. Id.
124. The Court in referring to the minimum contacts test presumably meant the version of that
test expounded in World-Wide because World-Wide was the most recent case preceding Insurance
Corp. dealing with the matter and because the Court did not indicate that any other minimum
contacts test was meant.
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court," 125 presumably means that personal jurisdiction, unlike subject
matter jurisdiction, is not independent of individual liberty concerns, and
strengthens this interpretation. Furthermore, this interpretation is con
sistent with the appended footnote, unlike an interpretation that saw the
Court as rejecting any link between sovereignty and personal jurisdiction.
If this analysis is correct, what the Court is saying can be restated as
follows: sovereignty limitations are relevant to personal jurisdiction in
indicating from which states, as a matter of personal liberty, an individ
ual is entitled to protection. This protection is solely a function of the
recognition of the individual's right to be free from an unrelated sover
eign. It is not a manifestation of some aspect of sovereignty limitations
so fundamental that they limit a court's power without regard to individ
ual interests. Such limitations of course exist; limitation on subject-mat
ter jurisdiction is one example. The Court is trying to say, however, that
personal jurisdiction does not flow from this systemic type of sovereignty
consideration, but rather from an individual's (waivable) right to be free
from unrelated sovereigns. On this reading, therefore, commencing a
consideration of personal jurisdiction with a consideration of limitations
on sovereignty is not merely appropriate, but necessary. All that Insur
ance Corp. adds is the caution that the personal jurisdiction rules de
duced from sovereignty limitations do not touch the fundamentals of
sovereignty so extensively that they cannot be waived.
The propriety of reading Insurance Corp. in this way is reinforced by
the consideration that sovereignty manifests itself in various ways. Sov
ereignty includes authority over both particular categories of activity and
particular people. Given the different aspects of sovereignty, different
limitations on sovereignty may differ in significance. If a court violates a
limit on subject-matter jurisdiction, for example, it is attempting to con
trol a category of activity that, in all circumstances, it may not control.
In so doing, the court flouts whatever rules limit its authority. But be
cause those same rules establish its authority, a court that exceeds its
subject-matter jurisdiction is essentially attacking the foundations of gov
ernment society has established. In contrast, a court that claims author
ity over persons not subject to it does harm at a less fundamental level.
It does not seek to control matters generally beyond its competence, but
only to deal with particular transactions that, although within the classes
of those it may address, involve people that it may not reach. The only
125. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.

Number 3]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

415

harm done, therefore, is to the people whose actions it seeks to control.
Because the interests potentially harmed in such circumstances are so
much narrower than is true with violations of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the dangers to basic limitations on government stemming from violations
of personal jurisdiction limitations are less severe. This difference in dan
ger is therefore reflected in differing waiver rules. Waiver of personal
jurisdiction is permitted, presumably, in part because those persons
whose interests are involved are easily identifiable. With respect to sub
ject-matter jurisdiction, however, the violations affect the interests of so
ciety as a whole. Waiver therefore is not possible, because waiver from
any source other than society generally would not come from the entity
whose interests were involved.
The notion that a limited type of limitation on sovereignty is involved
in personal jurisdiction thus makes Insurance Corp. easier to understand.
The Court is not saying that personal jurisdiction limitations do not flow
from sovereignty limitations. Rather, the Court is saying that once one
has gone through the process of determining the limitations that sover
eignty imposes on personal jurisdiction, the rules that one deduces re
main merely personal rights, waivable by the persons involved.
Violations of personal jurisdiction rules derived from sovereignty limita
tions do not touch the very core of the court's authority. Sovereignty in
the sense of touching the core of a court's authority is not implicated in
the Court's personal jurisdiction analysis. 126 Insurance Corp. therefore
126. Related to the question is whether World-Wide itself, in invoking "federalism" as a limita
tion on the reach of personal jurisdiction, was seeking to protect individual rights or to protect the
interests of other states. This Article concurs with Professor Drobak's conclusion that World-Wide
sought to protect the defendant's "interest in freedom from an unrelated sovereign." Drobak, supra
note 115. Any disagreement with this proposition is puzzling because nothing in World-Wide sug
gests the contrary. The Court in World-Wide made frequent reference to the sovereignty of states
other than the forum state but only in the context of explaining limitations on the forum's sover
eignty. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292-94. World-Wide argues that the existence of other states pre
cludes the conclusion that any smgle state's jurisdiction could be unlimited. Thus, if a state seeks to
coerce mto its courts a defendant to whom its writ does not attach, World-Wide acknowledges that
the defendant need not appear. Some commentators interpret World-Wide to stand for the proposi
t10n that the interests of other states were the source of limitations in jurisdiction and acknowledge
that the passages in question are susceptible of a defendant-centered reading. See, e.g., Lewis, The

Three Deaths of 'State Sovereignty' and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699, 712 (1983).

Professor Lewis, however, argues that this interpretation is "ultimately not persuasive" because
the Court "twice recently reaffirmed that personal jurisdiction turns on contacts, not convenience."
Id. In effect, he contends that the Court could not have intended merely to reaffirm the primacy of
contacts because that was unnecessary. Thus, the Court must have had some other purpose. Profes-
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does not contradict the analysis in this Article. 127
sor Lewis argues that the other purpose was to elevate sovereignty considerations to a limit on
jurisdiction separate from, and superior to, contacts considerations. Id. at 712-13.
This argument faces two difficulties. First, the argument tortures the language of World-Wide.
Throughout the opinion, the Court contrasted sovereignty limitations to issues of convenience and
forum interest rather than to contacts analysis. Indeed, prior to the passage that rejected absence of
inconvenience as a justification for jurisdiction, the World-Wide Court quoted International Shoe v,
Washington, 327 U.S. 310 (1945), for the proposition that a state cannot issue a judgment against a
defendant with whom it has "no contacts, ties or relations". World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
The second problem with Professor Lewis' argument is that it ignores two important reasons for
restating the Hanson principle: Justice Brennan's dissent and academic criticism of that decision.
Justice Brennan characterized the minimum contacts test as "outdated" and strongly advocated tests
for jurisdiction based entirely on convenience. Id. at 307-08, 311-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even
after World-Wide, various commentators have attacked the territorially based jurisdictional test. See
supra note 5. Thus, it is not surprising that Justice White took advantage of an opportunity to
reiterate a rule whose continued existence was questioned in so many quarters. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), because it focused on quasi in rem jurisdiction, and Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84 (1978), because it was a family law case, did not settle the question.
Professor Redish likewise acknowledged that World-Wide's treatment of federalism could be
viewed as a protection of individual rights on the theory that in a government created by the consent
of the governed, an individual is entitled to be judged only by the sovereign to which he owes alle
giance. Redish, supra note 5, at 1125-26. Professor Redish rejects this interpretation, however, for
three reasons. First, he asserts that the World-Wide Court was concerned exclusively with relations
between states. Second, he observes that government-by-consent concepts cannot explain jurisdic
tion over transients. Finally, he states without explanation that a mere assertion of jurisdiction
(assuming no inconvenience and application of appropriate substantive law) does not violate the
allegiance principle. Id.
None of Professor Redish's arguments for the "allegiance" concept withstand examination.
World-Wide was consistent with a view of defendants' rights that includes protection from alien
sovereigns. Professor Redish's interpretation is not compelled by the language of the opinion. Sec
ond, Professor Redish, not the Court, equates allegiance to government by consent. These concepts,
however, are different. Even undemocratic governments feel they are entitled to the allegiance of
their citizens. Although reference to consent principles cannot justify assertion of jurisdiction over
transients, a concept of temporary allegiance to local authority cannot be dismissed so easily. Fi
nally, Professor Redish's denial that the mere taking of jurisdiction does no violence to the allegiance
principle is not self-evident. After all, in taking jurisdiction, the state threatens a defendant with
judgment if he does not respond to its summons, and claims the right to seize his property to satisfy
any judgment rendered. If the existence of an allegiance limitation on authority is assumed, a state's
assertion of the right to coerce a defendant into court by threat�, and ultimately to compel him to
pay a judgment, should be sufficient to trigger the limitation. Whatever the source of a rule of law,
its relevance to a particular defendant is that a court asserted the rule as a basis for judgment against
the defendant; the judge, not the rule, decided that a defendant's property should be seized. Thus the
judge's right to allegiance is as relevant a question as the source of the obligation to obey the rule.
In summary, World-Wide can be read to espouse an individual rights principle, namely, the right
of defendants to be free from the jurisdiction of unrelated sovereigns. The arguments against that
reading either take the language of the opinion out of context, or ignore reasons why the Court could
have seen a need to restate the position it first enunciated in Hanson.
127. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984), and Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 105
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The Irrelevance of State Sovereignty

Professors Redish and Jay have raised important objections to arguS. Ct. 2965 (1985), also may cast doubt on this Article's analysis. Close examination of each opin
ion, however, demonstrates that no conflict exists.
In Keeton, the plaintiff sued the defendant for libel in New Hampshire. The plaintiff sought to
recover not only for damage to her reputation in New Hampshire, but also for her damage in all
other states in which the defendant's nationally distributed magazine circulated. 104 S. Ct. at 1477.
The Supreme Court upheld New Hampshire's jurisdiction over plaintiff's non-New Hampshire
claims, holding that the state's interest in cooperating with other states through the "single publica
tion rule" was adequate to support jurisdiction. 104 S. Ct. at 1478-80. Under the single publication
rule, the publication of a libel in a single issue of a magazine or newspaper is treated as a single tort
no matter how many copies of the item circulate and no matter where they appear. REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). This holding appears to conflict with this Article's analysis
because it permits New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction over torts-damage to plaintiff's reputation
in other states-no element of which took place in New Hampshire. Further, its reliance on "state
interest" analysis contradicts the argument in this Article that the state's interests are irrelevant to
the junsdictional inquiry.
Keeton is reconcilable with this Article, however, when the nature of the tort of defamation is
considered. In committing defamation, a defendant by a publication in one place simultaneously
harms the plaintiff's reputation in many places. It is certainly plausible to regard all aspects of the
tort as one transaction. From that point of view, any state where one part of that transaction takes
place could, consistent with the analysis presented here, pass upon the legal effect of the entire
transaction. The situation is no different from that which occurs when a state asserts criminal juris
diction over a robbery committed elsewhere when the perpetrators kidnap the victim and subse
quently murder him in the forum state, on the theory that the analytically separable robbery is part
of the same offense as the murder. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 372 So. 2d 32 (Ala. 1979), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 903 (1980). In both cases authority over one aspect of the
transaction is held to be adequate to justify assertion of authority over the entire transaction. In this
context, the Court's reference in Keeton to the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction can be seen as
an acknowledgment of the unitary character of the tort.
Shutts presents the unusual question of determining jurisdiction over nonresident unnamed mem
bers of a plaintiff class in a class action. In Shutts, Kansas had taken jurisdiction of a class action in
which the plaintiff class included a very high proportion of non-Kansans. 105 S. Ct. at 2967. The
Court observed that, in these circumstances, the absent class members faced the prospect of a loss of
property through state action in the form of extinction of the class members' claims against defend
ant by operation of res judicata. 105 S. Ct. at 2972. Nonetheless, the Court refused to hold that
Kansas' authority over the class was to be analyzed under the minimum contacts test. Id. This
holdmg would appear to contradict this Article because the position of the absent class members is
for most purposes indistinguishable from that of defendants; neither group has invoked the jurisdic
tion of the court and both stand to lose property by reason of the court action. If judicial jurisdiction
is territorially limited, then judicial authority over members of a plaintiff class ought to depend on
the �ame test as judicial authority over defendants; yet, the Court appears to reject this parallel.
Shutts m fact, however, is easily reconciled wuh the analysis of this Article. The Court held in
Shutts that junsdiction could be upheld because the state had provided class members an opportu
nity to opt out of the lawsuit. 105 S. Ct. at 2975. The Court observed, "Any plaintiff may consent to
1unsd1ction. . . . The essential question, then, is how stringent the requirement for a showing of
con�ent will be." Id. The Court then went on to hold Kansas' procedures adequate to permit an
mference of consent to jurisdiction from members of the plaintiff class. Id. Because the Court is
obviously referring to a form of actual consent, it is clearly not holding that state jurisdiction over
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ments linking personal jurisdiction to state sovereignty considerations.
Professor Redish argues that because "due process" as defined prior to
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment did not apply federalism
concerns to personal jurisdiction, and because no express constitutional
provision limits a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction, the only possi
ble justification for linking jurisdictional limitations to federalism con
cerns is that such concerns are implicit in the Constitution. 128 Professor
Redish, however, stresses the general undesirability of enunciating con
stitutional restraints on state authority that have no basis in the text of
the document. 129 He also asserted that restraints on personal jurisdiction
cannot be linked to assumptions about the Framers' view of the Constitu
tion's reach and cannot be classified as vital to the constitutional sys
tem. 130 According to Redish, such arguments are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Nevada v. Hall. 131
Professor Redish's argument has several flaws. First, it ignores funda
mental characteristics of the Constitution. The Constitution does not de
fine state powers, except insofar as they are restricted by prohibitions and
allocations of power to the federal government. Aside from the first two
sections of article IV, the Constitution does not address the interrelations
of the states respecting exercise of powers not pertaining to the central
government. One logically may speculate that it was thought unneces
sary in 1787 to devote extensive attention to the states and their mutual
relations. After all, the Constitution does not purport to be the source of
the states' authority to govern; the states were well-established political
bodies in 1787. Thus, the only reason to deal directly with the powers of
the states in the Constitution was to establish the obligations and prohibi
tions necessary to alter then-existing practices; it was unnecessary to
mention existing practices whose continuation was taken for granted.
Therefore, the Constitution's silence on the issue of personal jurisdiction
means less than Professor Redish suggests.
Professor Redish also does not adequately deal with the implications
of pre-fourteenth amendment interpretations of the full faith and credit
absent class members can be evaluated without explaining the basis of the state's authority: actual
consent. As previously argued, the idea that protections against excessive assertions of personal
jurisdiction can be waived is perfectly consistent with the position taken in this Article.
128. Redish, supra note 5, at 1129-30.
129. Id. at 1130.
130. Id. at 1130-31.
131. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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clause. In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 132 the Court interpreted that clause as not
extending the reach of the states' judicial jurisdiction as it stood in
1790. 133 D'Arcy thus held, in effect, that limits on state jurisdiction ex
isted despite the Constitution's silence on the subject and despite the ar
guably contrary language of the full faith and credit clause. Professor
Redish, however, urges that the full faith and credit clause was irrelevant
to personal jurisdiction issues, insisting that the clause concerned only
enforcement of judgments and choice of law and observing that "choice
of law and personal jurisdiction are very different questions." 134 He
characterizes D'Arcy as merely establishing an exception to the full faith
and credit clause. 135
Professor Redish's efforts to explain away the full faith and credit
clause cases fail. Although he is correct in asserting that personal juris
diction and choice of law raise different issues, personal jurisdiction has
traditionally been regarded in common-law jurisdictions as figuring
prominently in questions of enforcement of judgments. 136 Thus, full
faith and credit cases dealing with enforcement of judgments will often
touch on the personal jurisdiction issue. D'Arcy, one such case, found
limits on the personal jurisdiction of the states to exist because of the
absence of an intent in the Constitution to give to the states more exten
sive jurisdiction than they had prior to 1790. That is, D'Arcy looked
beyond the Constitutional text, relying on aspects of state sovereignty
that the Court found unaltered, albeit not mentioned, by the
Constitution. 137
The writings of Justice Story reinforce the view that the Constitution
assumes limitations on state jurisdiction. Justice Story stressed that,
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the states treated one another's
judgments as foreign 138 and that the full faith and credit clause "did not
132. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
133. Id. at 174-76.
134. Redish, supra note 5, at 1123.
135. Redish, supra note 5, at 1124.
136. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 966-71 (1982).
137. In D'Arcy, the Court observed that "the international law as it existed among the States in
1790.. rendered a state-entered Judgment void. D'Arcy, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 176. The Court held
that the Constitution and the full faith and credit clause were not intended to alter this aspect of the
law of 1790. Instead, they were intended to make judgments rendered in one state conclusive on the
merits mall states, rather than mere prima facie evidence on the merits as was true in 1790. Id. at
175-76.
138. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1307 (5th
ed. Boston 1891).

420

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 63:377

mean to confer a new power or jurisdiction; but simply to regulate the
effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons or things within
[state] territory." 139 If the Constitution was not intended to enlarge state
jurisdiction, however, the authority of the states necessarily remained as
limited as it was prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Both Justice
Story and the Supreme Court in D'Arcy, therefore, saw implicit in the
Constitution the assumption that the states' authority is territorially lim
ited because the Constitution did not alter the state's limited authority as
it existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
Thus, Story and D'Arcy undercut Professor Redish's arguments. In
deed, Professor Redish's argument is a classic example of one that proves
too much. Although nothing in the Constitution expressly forbids any
sort of exercise of state authority beyond state borders, such a limitation
is assumed to exist. 140 What prevents Arkansas from sending its high
way patrol to police the roads of Texas? A person arrested could not
complain of any lack of fairness, at least to the extent that Arkansas law
duplicated Texas law, but it is inconceivable that such an excess of execu
tive authority would be upheld.
Additionally, Nevada v. Hall141 cannot bear the weight that Professor
Redish assigns to it. Hall held that the Constitution did not affect the
question whether the states had an obligation to accord one another im
munity from judicial process. Because recognition of sovereign immu
nity was viewed solely as a matter of comity in 1789, the Court held that
no legal bar prevented a state from denying immunity to a sister state. 142
Professor Redish argues that subjecting a state to judicial process is a
greater interference with its interests than is an assertion of personal ju
risdiction over an inhabitant of the state. Thus, he concluded that if fed
eralism permits the one, it surely must permit the other. 143 The
federalism concerns addressed in World-Wide, however, focus on pro
tecting individuals from ultra vires acts, not on protecting the interests of
other states. 144 The holding in Hall is not inconsistent with an ultra vires
analysis: what was legally within a state's power in 1789, taking jurisdic
tion over another state, remains within its power; what was beyond its
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. § 1313 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 39-112 and accompanying text.
440 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 416-18.
Redish, supra note 5, at 1131-32.
See supra note 126.
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power in 1789, asserting jurisdiction over one foreign to its territory, re
mains beyond its power.
Professor Jay asserts yet another argument. He states that sovereignty
considerations are simply not appropriate in an analysis of the jurisdic
tion of state courts all in one country. He notes that the origin of this
approach rests in Justice Story's writings, and insists that such considera
tions made sense only in defining the jurisdiction of independent coun
tries. Such considerations were proper in that context, Professor Jay
argues, because one sovereign could well refuse to enforce another's judg
ments. The courts of one country entertained sovereignty considerations
to avoid handing down judgments that could not be enforced in the
courts of another country. Between American states, however, which
the Constitution requires to enforce each other's judgments, sovereignty
concerns have no place. 145
Professor Jay's argument ignores the context in which the question of
jurisdiction was likely to arise in Justice Story's day. Very often, that
question arose when the courts of one country had to decide whether to
enforce another country's judgment. If, in the view of the enforcing
court, the original court had jurisdiction, then the foreign judgment was
enforced. 146 In other words, a country's courts did not simply invoke
sovereignty-oriented jurisdictional rules to avoid rendering unenforceable
judgements, as Professor Jay implies; the courts also used those rules to
identify foreign judgments entitled to enforcement.
Once the matter is phrased this way, the argument for the use of sover
eignty-based jurisdictional rules in both the inter- and intra-national
arena is much stronger. In the international arena, the courts invoked
sovereignty considerations to decide whether another country's judg
ments should be enforced. Likewise, the American states employ territo
rial limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction to determine
whether a sister state's judgment should be enforced, and whether the
states should assert jurisdiction themselves. The inter- and intra-national
contexts therefore are not, as Professor Jay suggests, incompatible.
Rather, both involve determining the circumstances in which courts
ought to be able to take jurisdiction.
145. Jay, supra note 5, at 453-54.
146. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 586-90, 809-12 (Boston 1983).
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C. Fairness
Commentators frequently argue that a proper approach to jurisdiction
would simply focus on a "fair" balancing of the interests of the parties
and the state, ignoring the Pennoyer sovereignty approach. 147 More spe
cifically, they argue that considerations such as the parties' relative ca
pacities to litigate in a forum distant from their homes 148 and
convenience of litigation149 ought to govern personal jurisdiction analy
sis. Commentators even argue that modem courts in fact employ a fair
ness approach and that efforts to deduce limits on jurisdiction from other
general principles must therefore necessarily fail. 150
One obvious difficulty with the fairness argument is that fairness is not
an easy term to define. A determination of the relative ability of litigants
to bear the burdens of litigation is not an inherently better test of fairness
than, for example, the care that a state takes to avoid demanding obedi
ence from those defendants not properly subject to its authority. Even
assuming that considerations such as ability to bear burdens and conven
ience are the proper determinants of fairness, arguments that jurisdiction
should tum primarily on such factors are nonetheless flawed.
Any argument asserting fairness as the basis for personal jurisdiction
analysis fails to confront the core issue in jurisdictional inquiries. Char
acterizing the question as one of "jurisdiction" raises fundamental issues
as to extent of the state's authority. The extent of authority cannot be
resolved through fairness considerations unless such considerations are
the basis of state authority. Fairness considerations, however, are not the
source of state authority. For example, a state could more "fairly" give
relief to civil plaintiffs if it could serve process nationwide. The possibil
ity of enhanced fairness, however, does not establish the state's authority
to serve process nationwide. The basic issue in jurisdiction analysis is the
source of state authority. A personal jurisdiction analysis that is based
on the "fairness" of the result, therefore, simply misses the point.
147. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 5, at 3; von Mehren, supra note 6, at 300-11.
148. Jay, supra note 5, at 446-47; von Mehren, supra note 6, at 313-14.
149. Jay, supra note 5, at 448, 471; von Mehren, supra note 6, at 322-23.
150. von Mehren, supra note 113, at 53-54. Professor von Mehren apparently expressed this
view prior to the Supreme Court's World-Wide decision. He has since acknowledged that World
Wide looks to considerations of power as well as considerations of convenience. von Mehren, supra
note 6, at 3 IO n.93.
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D. Plaintiffs' Rights
A more serious argument is that territorially-based limitations on per
sonal jurisdiction ignore plaintiffs' constitutional right to sue.151 The
problem with this argument is that it is very difficult to establish that
such a constitutional "right to sue" exists.
Under the due process clause, a civil court's determination that it may
not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant will be unconstitutional only if
the plaintiff is thereby deprived of a property interest.152 The court's
action, therefore, cannot deny plaintiff due process unless it deprives him
of his right to recover from the defendant. A court's determination that
it lacks jurisdiction, however, does not affect the plaintiffs substantive
claim. 153 The plaintiff still may assert the cause of action in an appropri
ate court. The court's refusal to take the case does not violate the plain
tiffs due process rights.
Professor Brilmayer suggests that a dismissal on too narrow jurisdic
tional grounds can deprive the plaintiff of due process by forcing him to
litigate in a state with which he has no connection. 154 The lack of con
nection between a distant forum and the plaintiff, however, is not of con
stitutional significance. Contacts are required only between a state and a
person whose rights the state affirmatively claims authority to affect.
The state asserts no authority over the plaintiff, however, until the plain
tiff voluntarily enters the forum. Moreover, if a plaintiff faced with the
prospect of distant litigation loses his claim, it is not because any govern
ment has divested him of it, but because he does not pursue his claim. A
similarly placed defendant, in contrast, would lose property directly be
cause of a state's assertion of authority in the form of a default judgment.
Supreme Court decisions also militate against a plaintiffs right to sue
approach. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 155 the
Supreme Court held that a state was not obliged to take jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, though doing so would not have violated due
process.156 A plaintiff has no right to a forum if the states are not obliged
to take jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, because a "right to a
forum" in this context means an obligation by the state to coerce the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See, e.g., Jay, supra note 5, at 454.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.

2D OF JUDGMENTS§ 20(1)(1) (1982).
Brilmayer, supra note 33 at 108-11. See also Lewis, supra note 5, at 26-27.
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at 440-41, 446-49.
RESTATEMENT
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defendant into that state's courts. After Perkins, states clearly have no
such obligation. 157
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Halls 158 also is inconsis
tent with a plaintiffs right to sue argument. The plaintiff in Helicopteros
argued that Texas should have been able to take jurisdiction over a Co
lombian corporation because the corporation could not be sued jointly
with the American defendants in any other forum. The Court rejected
this argument, and observed that defendants might be sueable jointly in
the courts of various foreign countries. 159 If due process obliged a state
to provide a plaintiff with a forum, however, a plaintiff could not be
forced to litigate outside the United States.
The final difficulty with a plaintiffs right to sue approach is that it
conflicts with the basic principle that states control civil liability. If a
plaintiff argues that a refusal to take jurisdiction denies his right to a
forum, his objection must be that the state refused to coerce into court a
particular defendant alleged to have harmed the plaintiff. The plaintiff in
effect would be asserting that the state was compelled to give him an
opportunity to recover for a particular wrong. Under this view, the
state's failure to assert jurisdiction would deprive the plaintiff of a chance
to recover from any defendant over whom the state could have asserted
jurisdiction consistent with the fourteenth amendment. A plaintifrs
right to recover, however, also requires a determination that a defendant
has conducted himself in a manner that makes the defendant liable to the
plaintiff.
Once consideration is given to the role that substantive law plays in a
plaintiffs recovery, the plaintiffs "right" may be characterized two ways.
Under the first alternative, the state would be free to create whatever
rules of substantive law it chooses. Once the substantive rules were es
tablished, however, the state would be obliged to define the personal ju
risdiction of its courts consistently with constitutional requirements.
Thus, the Constitution indirectly would determine what individuals
would be subject to the state-defined substantive rules. Under the second
alternative, a plaintiff would have a right to a constitutionally defined
minimum level of protection. As with the first alternative, the state
would be obligated to extend its jurisdiction as far as the constitutional
minimum standard required; however, ·the state also would be constitu157. See Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 110 n.151.
158. 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984).
159. Id. at 1874 n.13.
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tionally required to create a minimum level of substantive protection. A
state would deprive a plaintiff of property under this theory if it did not
provide a means to recover against a defendant: (1) within the minimum
constitutionally mandated jurisdiction; and (2) who committed an act for
which the Constitution requires the state to provide a remedy. This the
ory would in effect make the Constitution the source of an individual's
substantive obligations.
The first alternative speaks in terms of a plaintiff's constitutional right
that a certain population be brought within the jurisdiction of the state's
courts. The second alternative, however, goes beyond the first, adding a
constitutional right to require a state to proscribe certain activities as
substantively unlawful. A hypothetical illustrates that less difference ex
ists between the two than might be supposed.
Assume that the defendant corporation, a manufacturer, is incorpo
rated in state A and has its corporate headquarters and production facili
ties in state A. The plaintiff is an individual resident of state B. The
defendant maintains a small mail order division at its headquarters, but
none of its products are distributed in state B. Defendant does a very
small mail order business with individuals in state B, but otherwise has
no connection with the state. The plaintiff orders a set of goods from the
defendant's mail order division. Plaintiff is injured at his residence when
the goods explode. Assume that if plaintiff is to recover from defendant,
he can prevail only on a strict liability theory. State A rejects the doc
trine of strict liability in tort; when state A's choice of law rules point
toward application of the law of a state that applies strict liability, state
A's courts will view the foreign rule as violative of state A's public policy
and therefore as inapplicable. Plaintiff therefore is reluctant to sue in
state A's courts. State B accepts strict liability, but it has no long-arm
statute. State B's statutes provide for jurisdiction over nonresident cor
porations only if they do business in state B. "Doing business", as used
in state B's statutes, has been judicially construed to mean a level of ac
tivity significantly greater than defendant's mail order trading.
Suppose plaintiff attacks state B's narrow jurisdictional statute, alleg
ing that it deprives him of his "property" right to sue defendant. For
plaintiff to prevail, a court would have to hold that the United States
Constitution compelled state B to assert jurisdiction over defendant be
cause defendant fell within the constitutionally required minimum juris
diction and state B had chosen to enact a substantive rule of law that
defendant had violated. Such a holding in effect would subject defendant

426

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 63:377

to a rule of substantive law to which it would not be subject if it could
not be haled into state B's courts. State B's legislature is not the source
of this substantive rule, as far as defendant is concerned. State B's legisla
ture clearly elected not to regulate defendant's conduct when it did not
enact a long-arm statute that would reach defendant, despite the knowl
edge that other states would not necessarily apply its law. Rather, the
source of the substantive rule as far as defendant is concerned is the Con
stitution. The plaintiff's right to sue argument compels state B to assert
jurisdiction and to subject defendant to state B's law despite state B's
legislative decision not to do so. A rule, therefore, that a state is consti
tutionally compelled to assert jurisdiction over an individual means that
the individual is compelled to obey whatever substantive rules that the
state courts will apply because of the constitutional requirement that the
state assert jurisdiction. Thus, for individuals, a rule ostensibly requiring
a state to assert jurisdiction amounts to a constitutional requirement that
these individuals obey particular substantive rules.
The Constitution, however, does not obligate states to apply particular
substantive rules to particular individuals. The manner in which a state
chooses to regulate private actions is purely a matter of state policy; its
decisions about the rules applicable to private conduct cannot be depriva
tions of property. 160 If the state is free to define the content of the law of
160. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Supreme Court upheld a state's right to regulate a previously unregulated business, stating:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only
one of the norms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of prop
erty which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due pro
cess; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the
whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Id. at 134. This rule has been followed consistently. See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122
(1929) (upholding Connecticut guest statute); Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 420
(1919) (upholding Arizona statute imposing employers' liability without fault for injuries to employ
ees). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32
(1978) (upholding act limiting liability for and establishing indemnity fund for accidents resulting
from operation of federally licensed nuclear power plants).
The Court in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), questioned whether a legisla
ture could abolish a cause of action or defense without providing a substitute, id. at 201, but ex
pressly declined to answer the question. Id. This "quid pro quo" concept found no favor in the
courts. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1270 (La. 1978) (upholding statute requiring resort
to medical malpractice mediation panel as prerequisite to suit); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282
Md. 274, 282-83, 385 A.2d 57, 62 (upholding statute requiring resort to medical malpractice media
tion panel as prerequisite to suit), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38
N.Y.2d 41, 56-57, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 13-14, 340 N.E.2d 444, 453-54 (1975) (upholding no-fault insur
ance law, rejects "quid pro quo" rule in dictum); Singer v. Shepard, 464 Pa. 387, 393-401, 346 A.2d
897, 900-04 (1975) (upholding no-fault law).
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persons subject to its jurisdiction, however, then the Constitution cannot
be the source of individuals' substantive legal obligations. The second
plaintiffs right to sue theory, therefore, must be false because it posits a
constitutionally required minimum level of substantive law. Further
more, a plaintiffs right to sue approach that looks solely to a jurisdic
tional minimum in fact, as in the above hypothetical, makes the
Constitution the effective source of particular individuals' substantive
legal obligations. Because the Constitution creates no rights in plaintiffs
to demand that states impose particular rules of substantive law on par
ticular groups, the conclusion follows that the Constitution cannot create
a plaintiffs right to demand a given scope of jurisdiction. Such a right
would be a disguised version of a constitutionally created substantive ob
ligation for particular defendants.
In summary, a plaintiffs constitutional rights are irrelevant to the
scope of a state's jurisdictional authority. Recognizing such interests is
inconsistent with the due process clause, conflicts with the cases, and
requires abandonment of the notion of state control of state substantive
law. Under American law, plaintiffs simply have no due process rights
relevant to the constitutional aspects of the proper reach of state
jurisdiction.
D.

Choice of Law and Jurisdiction

Some commentators have suggested that a focus on courts' jurisdiction
is misplaced, and that the proper focus should be on choice of law. 161
Taken to an extreme, a focus on choice of law would uphold the jurisdic
tion of any convenient forum. Strict choice of law rules would protect
defendant's interests under this theory, ensuring that the place of trial
would not disadvantage the defendant. Although this focus is plausible,
choice of law protections cannot substitute for limits on state court juris
diction for two reasons.
First, vast disagreement exists concerning both the proper constitu
tional limitations on states' freedom to apply their own law in cases with
multistate elements and the proper common-law approach to choice of
law. 162 The degree of dispute over the content of a "correct" set of con161. See Redish, supra note 5, at 1136-37; Shaffer v. Heitner, The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 33, 82 (1978); Silberman, supra note 7, at 116; Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449, 456-67 (1959).
162. For example, see the disagreements among the commentators in Symposium: Confiict-of
Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1981).
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flicts rules, the unsettled status of the traditional substance/procedure
distinction, 163 and the uncertain role of forum public policy 164 under
modern approaches, creates doubt that a yet-to-be devised set of conflicts
rules can be a reliable alternative to a territorially-based jurisdictional
system. 165
The Supreme Court's rationale for jurisdictional limitations presents a
more serious problem in using choice of law rules as a substitute for those
limitations. The Court's key concern in its personal jurisdiction deci
sions has not been protection of the defendant from prejudice in litiga
tion. The more important concern, not only in World-Wide, but also in
Pennoyer, International Shoe, and Hanson, has been protecting the de
fendant from an illegitimate assertion of governmental sovereignty. 166
Even ignoring whether any choice of law approach could somehow legiti
mize a putatively illegitimate exercise of authority, choice of law cannot
substitute for jurisdiction as a protection against ultra vires acts. Em
ploying choice of law theories not merely to increase litigation fairness,
but to compensate for the otherwise ultra vires character of the proceed
ings would cause serious problems in the administration of justice.
Consider, for example, if state A sought to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant with which it had no contacts at all, and sought to circumvent
its lack of authority over defendant by applying the law of state B, whose
authority over defendant was clear. In effect, state A would justify its
assertion of jurisdiction on the theory that it would treat the defendant
exactly as state B would. Accomplishing a real substitution of state B's
law for state A's, however, would be impossible.
First, the traditional rules permitting state A to apply its own proce
dural law and to refrain from applying a rule contrary to its public policy
could not be applied in this setting. If choice of law is to ensure litigation
fairness and to compensate for an otherwise excessive exercise of jurisdic
tion, the use of any rule pertaining to state A's jurisprudence would taint
the proceedings. The implications of this point reveal a more serious
problem.
The effort to legitimize proceedings by application of B's law necessar163. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 136, at 58-67.
164. See, e.g., id. at 72-75.
165. See, e.g.. von Mehren & Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice ofLaw: Some Reflec
tions on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 38 (1981).
166. World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958);
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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ily rests on the assumption that A will guarantee a result identical to that
state B's courts would reach. The problems of such an effort go beyond
the practical ones of unfamiliarity with the intricacies and traditional us
ages of a strange system, because the "law" of a state consists not only of
the state's rules, but also of the people and institutions that apply and
interpret the rules. Thus, mimicking the result that another state would
reach requires more than the application of another state's substantive
and procedural law. Achieving such a result would require state A's
court to duplicate the trial in state B, whose law is being applied, and
review of the trial court's decision by an exact replica of state B's appel
late system. Indeed, duplication may be impossible unless the decision is
appealable to the appellate courts of the state whose law is applied be
cause, at the appellate level, potential differences in result arising from
differences in personnel are quite possible. Such an inter-state appellate
process is most unlikely. However, without such a process, and the other
attempts at duplicating state B's system described above, state A would
not be applying state B's law. State A would merely be employing rules
drawn from state B's law in its own system, which has no legitimate
authority in the matter.
It might be argued that this scenario is much overdrawn. After all,
current choice of law practice stops far short of the effort at mimicry
described above. Even the federal courts retain authority to apply their
own rules in diversity cases, even in some cases in which application of
federal rules could produce a different result from that if the case were
tried in a state system. 167
A response based on current choice of law practice, however, ignores
the great difference between the function that choice of law would play in
the suggested scenario as opposed to both current choice of law practice
and the federal Erie doctrine. In the proposed scenario, a court is claim
ing authority to control the defendant only because it is employing a cor
rect choice of law approach. The court asserts, in effect, that the issue of
the legitimacy of its authority does not arise because the court is applying
the same rules that a legitimate authority would apply. Using choice of
law to legitimize a result is quite different from the role that choice of law
plays currently. Under the current system, only courts with jurisdiction
can hear a case. Their authority does not depend on choice of law rules.
When its authority over defendants does not depend on choice of law, a
167. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74 (1965).
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court can approach choice of law differently than a court whose author
ity does depend on choice of law. IIi the latter case, the court must make
itself indistinguishable from a court of legitimate authority, which is not
necessary under current practice.
Nor does the federal Erie doctrine undercut the proposed scenario.
Erie addresses the implications of the federal courts' lack of authority to
make substantive rules regarding questions raised in cases in which fed
eral subject-matter jurisdiction is based on the parties' diversity of citi
zenship. While federal courts facing Erie questions are constrained to
follow applicable state law with respect to a greater range of subjects
than in the typical state's choice of law rules, 168 the federal courts in
these circumstances do not feel obligated to make themselves carbon cop
ies of state courts. 169
Again, however, there are crucial differences between the scenario and
an Erie problem. Under the proposed scenario, the forum has no author
ity over a defendant unless it adheres to a proper choice of law approach.
In an Erie situation, by contrast, the federal lack of authority extends
only to questions of substantive law. Article III of the Constitution es
tablishes the authority of the federal courts to hear cases as a system
distinct from the states, and thus justifies the federal courts' use of their
own rules. 170 The federal courts' lack of authority relates to only part of
the judicial function, developing rules of substantive law. Courts whose
authority over a defendant depends entirely on copying a foreign state's
law must take a different approach than a court that only lacks authority
over questions of substantive law.
Thus, because of both the confusion in current choice of law doctrine
and the inability of a state's court system to transform itself into the
court system of another state, "correct" choice of law cannot justify an
otherwise ultra vires assertion of authority.
CONCLUSION

In 1979, Professor Hazard wrote:

[What the law of state court jurisdiction ought to be] depends upon the
premises from which one begins. One can start, for example, with some
thing like the following set of ideas: The federal union is made up of sepa
rate states; the states are endowed severally with sovereign power to
168. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 {1945).
169. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
170. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
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administer civil justice; state sovereignty is delimited by state territory; and
only such matters as can be considered "within" the state's territory are
within the state's judicial sovereignty. In this limited view of things, the
modern "minimum contacts" principle is merely a constraint on a theory of
jurisdiction that is based on a concept of the states as independent polities.
The state court systems are thus to be autonomous, self-sufficient, self-re
garding, and preoccupied with their separate legal existence, even at the
cost of being collectively ineffective to dispose of complicated multistate
cases.
On the other hand, one can view each state's court system as a constitu
ent of a national legal system whose common objective is to supply an ap
propriate forum for every domestic case, however complicated. Under this
view, the proper measure of a state's judicial authority is not what the state
as an independent polity might legitimately do, but what it ought to do in
tacit collaboration with courts of other states in order to establish a coher
ent national system of civil justice. 171

This expression of opinion pre-dates World-Wide, and no one appears
to have argued since 1980 that the limits on state court jurisdiction
should be analyzed as though the United States possessed a unitary "na
tional legal system." Nonetheless, this quotation helps to focus the point
of this Article. The logical implication of rejecting the idea that the state
courts are part of a "national legal system" is that state courts are "au
tonomous" and "self-sufficient," as befits arms of "independent polities."
This Article has shown that the assumption of the states' independence
permits the deduction of the character of limitations on state court juris
diction. Part II showed that state authority in the United States is gener
ally limited to controlling people, things, or events within state territory.
Assuming that a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction is limited in the
same way as are other exercises of authority, personal jurisdiction would
similarly extend only to people, things, or events within state territory.
World-Wide's general approach of focusing on territorial limitations on
state authority thus makes sense. The additional intent element, how
ever, does not correspond to limitations imposed in other areas of the
law, and therefore cannot be deduced from sovereignty concepts. Part
III refuted various objections and alternatives to this structural approach
to jurisdiction.
Personal jurisdiction is simply one way in which a government exer
cises authority. Rules of jurisdiction must therefore fit within whatever
171. Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 711, 720 (1979).
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limitations on government authority exist generally. By focusing on the
general limits of state sovereignty, World-Wide was at least asking the
right question, although its answer to that question is not entirely correct. In contrast, the critics of World-Wide do not address the relationship between jurisdiction and general state authority. Thus, their
problem is not simply the giving of a wrong answer-they ask the wrong
question.

